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ANTICIPATING A SEA CHANGE FOR INSIDER TRADING LAW:  
FROM TRADING PLAN CRISIS TO RATIONAL REFORM 
 
John P. Anderson* 
 
Abstract 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission is poised to take action in 
the face of compelling evidence that corporate insiders are availing 
themselves of rule-sanctioned Trading Plans to beat the market. These 
Trading Plans allow insiders to trade while aware of material nonpublic 
information. Since the market advantage insiders have enjoyed from Plan 
trading can be traced to loopholes in the current regulatory scheme, 
increased enforcement of the existing rules cannot address the issue. But, 
simply tweaking the existing rule structure to close these loopholes would 
not work either. This is because the SEC adopted the current rule as a part 
of a delicate compromise with the courts in the “use versus possession” 
debate over the proper test of scienter for insider trading liability. The 
current rule reflects the SEC’s preferred test (mere “awareness”), but it 
provides for Trading Plans as an affirmative defense in order to pass 
judicial scrutiny. Thus, any attempt to simply close the loopholes in 
Trading Plans while maintaining the awareness test would upset this 
delicate compromise. Only a comprehensive change to the current insider 
trading enforcement regime can address the issue. 
The reform proposed here begins with the recognition that Plan 
trading is generally done with the firm’s awareness and consent. Such 
trading is therefore a form of issuer-licensed insider trading. Since there 
are strong arguments that there is no moral wrong or economic harm done 
by issuer-licensed insider trading, the regulatory regime should openly 
embrace it as a permissible form of compensation through firm-sanctioned 
Modified Trading Plans, so long as there is adequate disclosure. Though 
such liberalization would represent a radical departure from the current 
enforcement regime, it would be within the SEC’s rulemaking authority, 
and would be consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Most importantly,  
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it would dramatically improve the current enforcement regime in terms of 
justice, clarity, efficiency, and coherence. 
It is sometimes said there is nothing like a good crisis for effecting 
much needed change. The current media attention and public scrutiny over 
corporate insiders’ exploitation of rule-sanctioned Trading Plans may be 
just the crisis to spur the SEC to adopt a more rational and just approach 
to insider trading enforcement. The outline for such reform is proposed 
here. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 2012, the Manhattan office for the United States Attorney 
launched a criminal investigation into whether corporate executives from seven 
different companies violated insider trading laws by improperly trading in shares of 
their own company’s stock.1 In an “era of unprecedented insider-trading 
prosecutions,”2 this investigation (and others initiated since3) represents a shift in 
focus by prosecutors and regulators from the aggressive prosecution of trading on 
material nonpublic information by tippees and misappropriators to true corporate 
insiders.4 The change in emphasis is a reaction to mounting public pressure in light 
of a recent series of academic studies5 and Wall Street Journal articles6 raising the 
                                                 
1 See Susan Pulliam et al., Insider-Trading Probe Widens—U.S. Launches Criminal 
Investigation into Stock Sales by Company Executives, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2012, at A1. 
2 Jenny Strasburg & James Sterngold, SAC Hit with Criminal Case—Prosecutor Calls 
Hedge Fund ‘Magnet for Market Cheaters’; Firm Denies Wrongdoing, WALL ST. J., July 26, 
2013, at A1. 
3 See Susan Pulliam et al., Insider-Trading Probe Trains Lens on Boards, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 30, 2013, 12:07 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873237981045 
78453260765642292, archived at http://perma.cc/F9D7-LJVH (discussing various 
investigations brought since December 2012). 
4 See Pulliam et al., supra note 1, at A1. 
5 See, e.g., Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55 
MGMT. SCI. 224, 226 (2009) (describing an academic study that “examines whether insiders 
strategically trade within the safe harbor”). 
6 See Rob Barry et al., Big Sales by Big Lots Brass—Executives’ Stock Moves Netted 
$23 Million Ahead of Bad News in April, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2012, 7:18 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324339204578173680170444970, 
archived at http://perma.cc/FK3L-AND5; Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Trading Plans 
Under Fire, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001 
424127887324296604578177734024394950, archived at http://perma.cc/4EC6-CJF5; 
Pulliam et al., supra note 3; Pulliam et al., supra note 1, at A1; Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, 
Directors Take Shelter in Trading Plans, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2013, at A1 [hereinafter 
Pulliam & Barry, Directors Take Shelter in Trading Plans]; Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, 
Executives’ Good Luck in Trading Own Stock, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2012, 11:17 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444100404577641463717344178, 
archived at http://perma.cc/QE56-AH8Y [hereinafter Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good 
Luck]; Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Executives Sold Amid Stock Buyback—Such 
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concern that corporate executives are gaining an unfair advantage over the market 
by exploiting “loopholes”7 or ambiguities8 in what are commonly referred to as 
10b5-1 trading plans. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted Exchange Act 
Rule 10b5-19 in 2000 as part of an attempt to clarify the elements of, and defenses 
to, insider trading liability under SEC Rule 10b-5.10 Among other things, Rule 10b5-
1 offers corporate executives an affirmative defense against the charge that they 
violated insider trading laws when they buy or sell shares in their company’s stock 
as part of a written plan (“Trading Plan” or “Plan”) entered into when the insider 
was not aware of material nonpublic information.11 This defense is available even if 
the insider later becomes aware of material nonpublic information at the time the 
Plan trades are executed.12 
                                                 
Transactions, Considered Red Flags to Investors, Raised Concerns Among Employees at 
Firm, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2012, at C1; Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Investors Call for 
More Disclosure of Executive Trades, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2012, 12:07 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324020804578147193237802774, 
archived at http://perma.cc/MC65-F9PN [hereinafter Pulliam & Barry, Investors Call for 
More Disclosure]; Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Trading Focus Is Pushed, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
24, 2013, at C1; Michael Siconolfi, Pension Funds Seek Insider Curbs, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
31, 2012, 8:01 PM) http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732363550457821178 
1992442110, archived at http://perma.cc/HR6G-PRMU; Michael Siconolfi & Jean 
Eaglesham, SEC Is Pressed to Revamp Executive Trading Plans, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2013, 
8:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324059704578473382576553 
460, archived at http://perma.cc/T9JM-XXMG.  
This recent series of articles was preceded by intermittent treatment of 10b5-1 trading 
plans by the Wall Street Journal after Rule 10b5-1 was adopted in 2000. See Matt 
Andrejczak, Mattel’s Chief Sells Near Highs Via Prearranged Trading Plan, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 30, 2008, at C18; Tony Cooke, Director’s Trade Plan Shields Against ‘Insider’ 
Suspicion, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2003, at C15; Tony Cooke & Serena Ng, Insiders Prosper 
Despite SEC Rule, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/ 
articles/SB112320798601405793, archived at http://perma.cc/78TK-D3FV; David J. 
Reynolds, Reddy Ice Executives Gain on Prearranged Trading Plans, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 
2008, at C7; Dionne Searcey & Kara Scannell, SEC Now Takes a Hard Look at Insiders’ 
‘Regular’ Sales, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2007, at C1; Ed Welsch, Trading Plans Offer a Good 
Clue to Sell; Aggressive 10b5-1s Especially Predict Underperformance, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
9, 2008, at C4. 
7 See, e.g., Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 6 (explaining the existing loopholes). 
8 Pulliam & Barry, Directors Take Shelter in Trading Plans, supra note 6, at A1. 
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014). 
10 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading: Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 
24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) [hereinafter August 2000 Exchange 
Act Release]. 
11 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c) (2014). Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B) lays out the specific 
requirements a plan must satisfy. Part II of this Article will explain the requirements of Rule 
10b5-1 more fully. 
12 August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,716 (explaining that the 
affirmative defense is available to insiders who trade under a 10b5-1 plan while aware of 
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Despite the fact that Rule 10b5-1 precludes insiders from entering into a 
Trading Plan while aware of material nonpublic information, multiple studies 
indicate that insiders trading through these Plans manage to significantly outperform 
the market.13 These studies, along with recent press highlighting examples of 
suspiciously timely trades by company executives, have led investors, former 
regulators, and academics to conclude that, contrary to the SEC’s intentions for the 
rule, it has been a “huge gift to insiders . . . .”14 Insiders are using these Trading Plans 
as a “tool” for trading on material nonpublic information while avoiding civil or 
criminal liability.15 
The concern that Rule 10b5-1 has become a de facto safe harbor for insiders 
trading on material nonpublic information has spurred public demands for the SEC 
to take action. Thomas Kim, former chief counsel of the SEC’s Division of 
Corporation Finance, responded to media reports of Trading Plan abuse, stating that 
the SEC would “love to catch” a high-ranking corporate executive abusing the 
Trading Plans “and use him as an example.”16 According to Kim, the SEC is 
“looking for big cases to send a message.”17 But, for many, enforcement is not 
enough. Citing the recent Wall Street Journal articles, the Council of Institutional 
Investors (“CII”), a nonpartisan association of public, corporate, and union pension 
funds with assets of more than three trillion dollars, sent a December 2012 letter to 
the SEC expressing the concern that “many executives at public companies have 
adopted practices with respect to Rule 10b5-1 plans that are inconsistent with the 
spirit, if not the letter of Rule 10b5-1.”18 CII therefore requested that the SEC 
                                                 
material nonpublic information, so long as the insider was not aware of that information 
when entering into the plan). 
13 See, e.g., Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. The Wall Street 
Journal’s own study reflects that among 20,237 of insiders “who traded their own company’s 
stock during the week before their companies made news, 1,418 executives recorded average 
stock gains of 10% (or avoided 10% losses) within a week after their trades.” Id. This was 
approximately double the number of those who had the stock “move against them that 
much.” Id.; see also Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 228–30 (noting that Plan 10b5-1 “sales 
transactions appear to follow systematic run-ups and precede systematic declines” while 
purchases “appear to precede systematic run-ups”). 
14 Pulliam & Barry, Investors Call for More Disclosure, supra note 6. 
15 Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 6 (“Companies are using these plans as a tool . . . 
that allows executives to do insider trading” (quoting Lisa Lindsley, a director at the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Union)). 
16 Yin Wilczek, No Conclusion on 10b5-1 Plans, but SEC Monitoring Situation, 
Official Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 18, 2013, 3:12 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com 
/s/news/2d7316f12bf2b30c45edb8a7e04297b1/document/MLHA5C3H65TU?headlineOnly
=false&highlight=Yin+Wilczek, archived at https://perma.cc/E9U9-JZND (quoting Thomas 
Kim, former chief counsel of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance). 
17 Id. 
18 Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to Elisse 
B. Walter, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 28, 2012) (discussing the potential 
misuse of Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans for executive sales of company stock), available at 
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2012/12_28_12_cii_letter_to
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“consider pursuing interpretive guidance or amendments to Rule 10b5-1” to close 
loopholes and foreclose the possibility of future abuse of Trading Plans by 
exploitation of ambiguities in the Rule.19 
Whether or not the studies indicating insider exploitation of Trading Plans are 
accurate, perception is often all that matters to the financial markets.20 Moreover, 
the uncertainty generated by the confusion and vagueness in the current regulatory 
landscape is costly to firms, exposing all Plan trades (innocent and unethical alike) 
to suspicion21 and potential litigation. With such pressure mounting for change, it is 
almost certain the SEC will take some form of action in the near future.22 
There are a number of reasons why an enduring solution to the problem of 
Trading Plans will not be simple to tailor within the existing insider trading 
enforcement framework. Since much of the problem stems from conduct that is 
actually permitted by the letter of the rule, mere interpretive guidance from the SEC 
would be inadequate, and attempts to discourage such trading by means of 
aggressive criminal prosecution would violate moral and constitutional principles. 
This leaves actual revision of the relevant statutes and/or rules as the only viable 
option. But Rule 10b5-1 was adopted to effect a delicate compromise between the 
SEC and the courts on the issue of whether actual “use” or mere “knowing 
possession” of material nonpublic information is necessary to establish liability for 
insider trading under Rule 10b-5.23 Since the affirmative defense for Plan trading 
was a crucial aspect of this compromise, nothing short of a significant departure 
from the current regulatory regime, a complete sea change, will be adequate to 
address the exploitation of Trading Plans. In anticipation of such a sea change in 
insider trading law, this Article suggests a path forward that, though representing a 
radical departure from the existing regime, would preserve its core concerns while 
improving it in terms of clarity, efficiency, and justice. A crucial premise of the 
proposed reform is that, at least in some circumstances, insider exploitation of 
Trading Plans may not be morally wrong or economically harmful. 
  
                                                 
_sec_rule%20_10b5-1_trading_plans.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3BMD-6EUM. 
19 Id. When the SEC did not take immediate action, CII reiterated this request in a May 
2013 letter. See Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, 
to Mary Jo White, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2013/05_09_13_cii_letter_to
_sec_rule_10b5-1_trading_plans.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZQ59-4KTM. 
20 See Michael S. Melbinger, Rule 10b5-1Trading Plans Gain Attention in National 
Spotlight, 9 CCH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, no. 1, Mar. 20, 2013, available at 2013 WL 
5232111. 
21 See Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. 
22 See Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 6. 
23 See August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,716. 
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Part II provides the historical background for Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans. It 
begins with a summary of the insider trading regime under Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,24 including the element of scienter which gave rise 
to the “use” versus “possession” debate that Rule 10b5-1 was intended to resolve. 
Part II closes by detailing the requirements of Rule 10b5-1 and the current 
understanding of Trading Plans under the rule. 
Part III offers context for the current controversy by comparing the SEC’s 
intended uses for Trading Plans with the reality of how they are being used by 
insiders and firms. 
Part IV addresses the extent to which insiders’ use of Trading Plans to gain a 
market advantage complies with current law. Although some uses of Trading Plans 
are clearly legal and some are clearly illegal, the legal status of a range of Plan 
trading remains unclear. Part IV closes by raising moral, constitutional, and 
economic concerns weighing in favor of broad reform in the midst of such 
uncertainty. 
In anticipation of such reform, Part V suggests that many of the simple revisions 
suggested by scholars, former regulators, and market participants would either fail 
to address the purported problem, or would undermine the delicate “use versus 
possession” compromise Rule 10b5-1 was designed to effect. Part V concludes by 
suggesting that nothing short of a complete overhaul of the existing regime will 
suffice to address the controversy. 
Finally, Part VI outlines and defends the reform proposed here. This path to 
reform begins with the recognition that Plan trading is typically done with the firm’s 
awareness and consent. Thus, even when based on material nonpublic information, 
such trading is a form of issuer-licensed insider trading.25 Since there are strong 
arguments that no moral or economic harm is done by issuer-licensed insider trading, 
such trading should be legalized as a permissible form of compensation, so long as 
it is regulated through a modified Trading Plan regime that requires disclosure. 
Though such liberalization would represent a radical departure from the current 
enforcement regime, it is consistent with precedent permitting persons to trade based 
on material nonpublic information in other circumstances and arguably coheres with 
the existing insider trading enforcement framework set out by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. O’Hagan.26 This proposed liberalization of insider trading law 
would be strictly limited to issuer-licensed insider trading through modified, firm-
sanctioned Trading Plans; it would not protect insiders who trade in violation of 
some promise or other commitment to their firms or those who trade on 
misappropriated information. And, of course, firms would be required to disclose 
their use of these modified Plans, as well as insiders’ profits from their use. Part VI 
concludes by emphasizing the ways in which this liberalized insider trading regime 
                                                 
24 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
25 See John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014 
UTAH L. REV. 1, 28 (arguing that “nonpromissory insider trading”—here, “issuer-licensed 
insider trading”—is morally permissible). 
26 521 U.S. 642, 675–76 (1997). 
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would offer an improvement over the existing regime in terms of clarity, efficiency, 
and justice. 
 
II.  ORIGIN OF 10B5-1 AS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN “USE” AND “POSSESSION” 
 
The crime of insider trading has never been expressly defined by statute or 
rule.27 Instead, Congress and the SEC have been content to allow insider trading law 
to develop through the courts and by administrative action.28 The principal statutory 
authority for modern insider trading law is found in the language of Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act,29 which was implemented by the SEC in Exchange Act Rule 
10b-5.30 Section 10(b) proscribes the employment of “any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance” in “connection with the purchase or sale, of any security.”31 
                                                 
27 Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act (which prohibits short-swing trading by corporate 
directors, officers, and shareholders who own more than 10% of the company’s stock) and 
SEC Rule 14e-3 (which prohibits insider trading in connection with tender offers) are 
perhaps exceptions, but they are strictly limited in scope and do not address the typical case 
of insider trading. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 
27 (2d ed. 2007). 
28 See id. at 28–29. During Congressional hearings concerning the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984, it was urged that the crime of insider trading be defined with 
specificity, but Congress opted not to do so. Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A 
Critical Assessment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 960, 988, 
993. 
29 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). While Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 provide the principal 
legislative and statutory authority for the regulation of insider trading (and will be the main 
focus of this Article), it should be noted that insider trading cases may be based on other 
authority as well. The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 comprises a general antisecurities fraud 
provision at 18 U.S.C. § 1348, whereby persons may be imprisoned up to twenty-five years 
for “knowingly” executing a “scheme or artifice” to “defraud any person” in connection with 
a security of a public company or for obtaining “money or property” under “false or 
fraudulent pretenses” in connection with the purchase or sale of any such security. Insider 
traders are also sometimes prosecuted under Exchange Act Section 17(a), S.E.C. Rule 14e-
3 (under Exchange Act Section 14(e)). In addition, prosecutors sometimes rely on the general 
mail and wire fraud provisions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 in insider trading cases. 
E.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 20 (1987) (defendants convicted under federal 
mail and wire fraud statutes in addition to Section 10(b)). Finally, even if an individual is not 
found guilty of fraud or deceit in connection with a securities trade, she may still be subject 
to criminal prosecution for a process offense such as for knowingly and willfully making a 
materially false representation to the SEC or a federal agent during the course of an insider 
trading investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). This is the statutory provision under which 
Martha Stewart was ultimately convicted. See Joel M. Athey et al., United States: DOJ Shifts 
Stance on False Statements Prosecutions, MONDAQ (June 2, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com 
/unitedstates/x/317704/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/DOJ+Shifts+Stance+on+False+Statem
ents+Prosecutions, archived at http://perma.cc/2AKB-QW6E. 
30 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014). 
31 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
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Although Congress designed Section 10(b) as a “catchall”32 clause to give the 
SEC flexibility to regulate manipulation and deception in connection with securities 
transactions, the Supreme Court has made it clear that “what it catches must be 
fraud.”33 The elements of insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 must therefore resemble those of common law fraud.34 But while fraud typically 
requires an affirmative misrepresentation,35 insider trading usually involves silence 
or a failure to disclose.36 Recognizing that the common law only deems silence to 
be fraudulently deceptive where circumstances impose a duty of disclosure,37 the 
Supreme Court has offered two theories under which a Section 10(b) duty to disclose 
exists: the “classical theory” and the “misappropriation theory.”38 
Under the classical theory, the duty to disclose arises from the relationship of 
trust and confidence between the actual parties to the trade.39 A corporate insider 
who seeks to benefit from material nonpublic information by trading in her own 
company’s shares thereby violates a “fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
confidence”40 to the current or prospective shareholders of the company on the other 
side of the transaction. Recognizing such a duty to disclose guarantees that those 
“who have an obligation to place the shareholder’s welfare before their own, will 
not benefit personally [at the expense of the shareholder] through [the] use of 
material, nonpublic information.”41 
The misappropriation theory applies to corporate outsiders who gain material 
nonpublic information by deception and then seek to benefit by trading on that 
information.42 Under the misappropriation theory, the duty to disclose arises from a 
duty of trust and confidence to the source of the information, not to the counterparty 
to the transaction.43 The misappropriator deceives “those who entrusted him with 
access to confidential information” by depriving them “of the exclusive use of that 
information.”44 Combined, the classical and misappropriation theories complement  
 
                                                 
32 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980). 
33 Id. at 235. 
34 See id. at 225–26. 
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
36 In the rare cases where insider trading deception does involve an affirmative 
misrepresentation, the duty-to-disclose requirement need not be met. E.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 
574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding a hacker’s gaining access to a computer database by 
misrepresenting his identity was an affirmative deception so no independent duty to disclose 
was necessary to establish the requisite deception under 10(b)). 
37 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) 
(1976)). 
38 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997). 
39 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230; see also O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (quoting 
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–29). 
40 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)). 
41 Id. at 230. 
42 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53. 
43 Id. at 653. 
44 Id. at 652. 
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one another to fill out the prohibition of insider trading as a form of Section 10(b) 
fraud.45 
In addition to establishing the duty to disclose, common law fraud requires a 
finding of scienter.46 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has consistently asserted that 
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires a finding of this mental state 
of intent to deceive or manipulate.47 For example, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,48 
the Supreme Court looked to the language and legislative history of Section 10(b) to 
reach the conclusion that mere negligence could not support liability under Rule 
10b-5.49 The Court explained that the “words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in 
conjunction with ‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended 
to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct”50 and “[t]here is no indication . . . 
that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter.”51 
 
A.  Use Versus Possession 
 
Purchases and sales of a company’s shares by its insiders are quite common. 
Indeed, many corporate insiders receive a large portion of their compensation in firm 
stock. This compensation would be worthless if the shares could not be sold at some 
point.52 Within this context, it is easy to see how the element of scienter can 
complicate the already difficult task of insider trading enforcement for the SEC. 
Section 10(b) only prohibits insiders from trading in their own company’s shares if 
they do so based on material nonpublic information. But there are any number of 
alternative, innocent explanations an insider might offer for the sale of shares: 
diversifying her portfolio, paying for a child’s upcoming wedding or college tuition, 
building a new house, buying a boat, etc. Such alternative motives are easy to 
manufacture and difficult to disprove. 
Historically, the SEC sought to overcome this challenge by taking the position 
that the element of scienter in Rule 10b-5 could be satisfied by the insider’s knowing 
possession of material nonpublic information, regardless of whether it is proved the 
information actually caused the relevant transaction.53 This strategy met with mixed 
                                                 
45 Id. at 652–53. 
46 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
47 See Carol B. Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b5-1 and the Death of 
Scienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 155 (2003) (noting the Supreme Court “has repeatedly 
asserted that [Rule 10b-5] liability involves deceptive acts, not just bad management, and 
deception necessarily implicates state of mind”). 
48 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
49 Id. at 214 (involving alleged negligence in an audit that failed to uncover a bank 
president’s fraudulent investment scheme). 
50 Id. at 197. 
51 Id. at 202; see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 464–68 (1977) 
(holding Section 10(b) liability must involve intent to manipulate or deceive). 
52 See, e.g., Karl T. Muth, With Avarice Aforethought: Insider Trading and 10b5-1 
Plans, 10 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 65, 67 (2009). 
53 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 90. 
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results in the courts. In United States v. Teicher,54 an attorney fed material nonpublic 
information about his firm’s corporate client’s merger and acquisition plans to others 
who then traded on that information.55 The tippee traders were convicted of insider 
trading pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.56 The traders appealed their 
convictions by challenging, inter alia, the jury instruction that embraced the SEC’s 
possession standard.57 In dicta, the Second Circuit endorsed the SEC’s possession 
standard,58 noting that (1) the “in connection with” language of both Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 is to be interpreted “flexibly;”59 (2) the mere possession standard 
comports with the “disclose or abstain” maxim that is so often quoted in insider 
trading jurisprudence;60 and (3) the “knowing possession” standard has the practical 
benefit of simplifying the task of enforcement.61 
In SEC v. Adler,62 however, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the SEC’s knowing 
possession standard. This case involved a corporate director’s sale of shares in his 
own firm’s stock while in knowing possession of material nonpublic information.63 
The director offered the defense that the sale in question was part of a trading plan 
that predated his acquisition of the material nonpublic information in question.64 The 
court began its analysis by noting that while Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5-1 do not 
expressly address the question of whether an insider’s mere possession of material 
nonpublic information at the time of trading is enough to establish liability, their 
language “suggests a focus on fraud, deception, and manipulation.”65 Next the court 
recognized that the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated, if only in dicta, that the 
element of scienter for insider trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5-1 requires 
proof the insider or misappropriator “use[d],”66 “[took] advantage of,”67 or traded 
“on the basis of,”68 material nonpublic information. In addition, the court pointed 
out that even the SEC has been inconsistent on the issue of “use versus possession.”69 
                                                 
54 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). 
55 Id. at 114–17. 
56 Id. at 118. 
57 Id. at 119. 
58 Based on the entirety of the record, the court concluded that any defect in the 
instruction was harmless because, even on a causal connection standard, no reasonable jury 
could have reached a different result. See id. at 121. 
59 Id. at 120. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). 
63 Id. at 1339. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1333. 
66 Id. at 1333–34 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659–60 (1983)). 
67 Id. at 1333 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–28 (1980)). 
68 Id. at 1334 (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)). 
69 Id. at 1335 n.26. The Court notes that in In re Investors Mgmt. Co., [1970–71 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), ¶ 78,163, at 80,514, 80,519 (July 29, 1971), “the SEC 
concluded that one of the elements of an insider trading violation under § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 is that the material nonpublic information ‘be a factor in the insider’s decision to effect 
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Ultimately, the Adler court concluded the “use test” is the most appropriate because 
it “best comports with the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and with Supreme 
Court precedent.”70 
Nevertheless, in a nod to the difficulty the SEC faces in proving use in this 
context, where “the motivations for the trader’s decision to trade are difficult to 
prove and peculiarly within the trader’s knowledge,”71 the court holds that “when an 
insider trades while in possession of material nonpublic information, a strong 
inference [of use] arises . . . .”72 The insider can, however, “rebut the inference by 
adducing evidence that there was no causal connection between the information and 
the trade.”73 Later that same year, the Ninth Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in 
expressly rejecting the SEC’s possession test in United States v. Smith,74 this time in 
the context of a criminal insider trading case. The Smith court relied heavily on the 
reasoning of Adler.75 
 
B.  SEC Adopts Rule 10b5-1 
 
With two circuits rejecting the SEC’s knowing possession test in the same year, 
the trend in the courts appeared to be in favor of requiring a causal connection 
between the possession of material nonpublic information and trading to establish 
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Rather than risk further erosion of its 
enforcement power by the courts, the SEC proposed Rule 10b5-1 a year later in 
December 1999,76 and it was adopted in October 2000.77 
The preliminary note to Rule 10b5-1 explains that the rule “defines when a 
purchase or sale constitutes trading ‘on the basis of’ material nonpublic information 
in insider trading cases brought”78 under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The note 
adds that the law of insider trading is “otherwise defined by judicial opinions 
construing Rule 10b-5, and Rule 10b5-1 does not modify the scope of insider trading 
law in any other respect.”79 
                                                 
the transaction.’” Adler, 137 F.3d at 1336. The court then points out that, later, in Report of 
the Investigation in the Matter of Sterling Drug, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH), ¶ 81,570, at 80,295, 80, 298 (Apr. 18, 1978), the SEC reversed course, stating 
“Rule 10b-5 does not require a showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose of 
taking advantage of material non-public information.” Id. 
70 Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337–38. 
71 Id. at 1337. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 155 F.3d 1051, 1070 (9th Cir. 1998). 
75 See id. at 1066–69. 
76 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7787, 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,846 (Dec. 20, 1999). 
77 See August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,716. 
78 Trading “on the basis of” Material Nonpublic Information in Insider Trading Cases, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014). 
79 Id. 
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Section (a) of Rule 10b5-1 incorporates both the classical and misappropriation 
insider trading theories by expressly providing that among the “manipulative and 
deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is included the 
purchase or sale of a security “on the basis of”80 material nonpublic information “in 
breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or 
derivatively, to the issuer of that security,” its shareholders, “or to any other person 
who is the source of the material nonpublic information.”81 The “use versus 
possession” issue is then addressed in Section (b) by defining “on the basis of” for 
purposes of the rule as nothing more than being “aware” of material nonpublic 
information at the time of the trade.82 In defining “on the basis of” in terms of 
“awareness,” one commentator notes “the SEC may have indulged in some linguistic 
legerdemain, . . . arguably transforming a phrase that connotes a deliberate act . . . 
into something less.”83  
Though the SEC chose the term “aware” rather than “possess,” it appears to be 
a distinction without much of a difference.84 The final release announcing the rule’s 
adoption explains that “the goals of insider trading prohibitions . . . are best 
accomplished by a standard closer to the ‘knowing possession’ standard,”85 but, 
nevertheless, the SEC recognizes that “an absolute standard based on knowing 
possession, or awareness, could be overbroad in some respects.”86 The release 
explains that the “new rule attempts to balance these considerations by means of a 
general rule based on ‘awareness’ of the material nonpublic information, with 
several carefully enumerated affirmative defenses.”87 The sole perceivable 
distinction between knowing possession and the awareness standard adopted 
appears to be the availability of affirmative defenses in Section (c) of the rule. 
  
                                                 
80 Id. § 240.10b5-1(a); see also Swanson, supra note 47, at 191. 
81 Id. § 240.10b5-1(a). 
82 Id. § 240.10b5-1(b). 
83 Allan Horwich, The Origin, Application, Validity, and Potential Misuse of Rule 
10b5-1, 62 BUS. LAW. 913, 921 (2007). 
84 The SEC has not defined the term “aware,” choosing to leave it to the courts to 
determine whether it requires some degree of knowledge beyond mere knowing possession. 
See id. at 921–22. 
85 August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,727. As one commentator 
notes, “[t]aken in isolation, this rationale simply says that lowering the threshold of liability 
will reach more conduct.” Horwich, supra note 83, at 921. 
86 August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,727. 
87 Id. (emphasis added). 
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C.  Requirements for Trading Plans as an Affirmative Defense 
 
Section (c) details three affirmative defenses to insider trading liability. The rule 
provides that a trade is not “on the basis of” material nonpublic information if the 
trade strictly complies88 with a binding contract,89 instruction,90 or Trading Plan91 
that was entered into before “becoming aware” of the information. Since Trading 
Plans are central to this Article, this summary will focus exclusively on them. A 
Trading Plan must be written to qualify for the affirmative defense.92 It must specify 
the amount, price, and date of the securities to be purchased or sold93 or include a 
written “formula or algorithm, or computer program” that determines the same.94 In 
addition, the Trading Plan must not permit any subsequent influence by the person 
availing herself of the Plan “over how, when, or whether to effect [Plan] purchases 
or sales . . . .”95 If the Plan grants discretion to another person to make trades under 
it, that person must not be aware of material nonpublic information when doing so.96 
Moreover, the affirmative defense is not available under a Plan if the person who 
entered into the Plan subsequently altered or deviated from its terms.97 Nor is it 
available if the person who entered into the Plan subsequently enters into or alters a 
“corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those securities.”98 
A person is free to modify an existing Plan while unaware of material nonpublic 
information, but this has the effect of terminating the existing Trading Plan and 
entering into a new one.99 Finally, a Trading Plan only provides an affirmative 
defense to insider trading liability when it was “entered into in good faith and not as 
part of a plan or scheme to evade the prohibitions” of Rule 10b-5.100 
  
                                                 
88 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i) (2014). 
89 Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(1). 
90 Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(2). 
91 Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(3). 
92 Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A). Trading Plans differ from the other two Rule 10b5-1 
affirmative defenses in this way. Neither the 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(1) contracts nor 10b5-
1(c)(1)(i)(A)(2) instructions need be in writing to comply with the rule. See Exchange Act 
Rules, Questions and Answers of General Applicability, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/exchangeactrules-interps.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9URF-JBSK (last updated Feb. 13, 2012) [hereinafter SEC Interpretations] 
(see Question 120.24 and accompanying text). 
93 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(1). 
94 Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(2). 
95 Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C); see also August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 
10, at 51,728. 
98 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C); August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 
10, at 51,728. 
99 August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,728 n.111. 
100 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(ii). 
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It is important to note that the SEC has made it clear that it does not regard the 
act of terminating an existing Trading Plan while aware of material nonpublic 
information as a violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.101 However, while one 
may terminate an existing Plan without risk of insider trading liability for the 
termination, the SEC has taken the position that such termination “could affect the 
availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior plan transactions if it calls into 
question whether the plan was ‘entered into in good faith and not as part of a plan or 
scheme to evade’ the insider trading rules.”102 If a person were to cancel just one 
trade under an existing Plan, this would constitute an alteration or deviation from 
the Plan and would result in its termination.103 To qualify for the affirmative defense, 
any subsequent transactions would have to be part of a new Plan.104 The affirmative 
defense would apply to trades under the new Plan, but only so long as they satisfy 
the requirements of the rule, including, of course, the requirement of good faith.105 
If, after terminating an existing Plan, a person later created a new Trading Plan, then 
“all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the period of time between 
the cancellation of the old plan and the creation of the new plan” would be taken 
into account in the determination as to whether the new Plan was established in good 
faith.106 For instance, though former Qwest Communications CEO, Joseph Nacchio, 
was charged for insider trading over a five-month period that spanned multiple 
Trading Plans, he was only found criminally liable for trades that occurred after his 
initial Plan was terminated.107 Thus, frequent Trading Plan modifications may 
jeopardize availability of the affirmative defense.108 
 
D.  SEC’s Compromise, Scienter, and Lingering Questions 
 
Although Rule 10b5-1’s definition of “on the basis of” as mere “awareness” 
rejects the causal connection test endorsed in Adler,109 the availability of affirmative 
defenses under the rule reflects a compromise. As noted above, while the Adler court 
adopted the use test, it held that mere possession was enough to create a strong, 
                                                 
101 See SEC Interpretations, supra note 92 (explaining at Question 120.17 that Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only apply to fraudulent conduct “in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security”).  
102 Id. (see Question 120.18 and accompanying text). 
103 Id. (see Question 120.19 and accompanying text). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 See United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 2008), vacated in 
part on other grounds en banc, 555 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009). 
108 Peter J. Romero & Alan L. Dye, Insider Trading Under Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, 
in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 893, 905–06 (ALI-ABA Course of 
Study, July 18–20, 2002) (“It would be unwise . . . for a person to engage in frequent 
modifications of trading plans.”). 
109 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 92–93 (stating that “Rule 10b5-1 formally 
rejects the Adler position”). 
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though rebuttable, presumption that the requisite causal connection was present. 
Thus, when considering Rule 10b5-1’s awareness test alongside the availability of 
its affirmative defenses, some commentators have suggested that the rule and Adler 
are not so far apart, at least not in terms of practical consequence.110 
Given the trend toward the use test in the federal courts, it is likely the SEC 
chose to adopt this compromise rather than a strict knowing possession test to 
improve the new rule’s chances of survival under judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, 
while Rule 10b5-1 reflects a compromise between the strict knowing possession test 
originally advocated by the SEC and the use test in Adler, there remain clear 
differences. Most importantly, while any evidence sufficient to undermine the causal 
connection between the information and the trading may undermine presumption of 
use under Adler, proof of awareness under 10b5-1 can only be defeated by the 
strictly defined affirmative defenses detailed in 10b5-1(c). In other words, the 
affirmative defenses identified by the rule are exclusive.111 The SEC rejected 
comments suggesting that the 10b5-1 affirmative defenses should be understood as 
part of a nonexclusive safe harbor.112 The SEC explained that “adding a catch-all 
defense or redesignating the affirmative defenses as non-exclusive safe harbors 
would effectively negate the clarity and certainty that the rule attempts to 
provide.”113 
Thus, an insider who trades while aware of material nonpublic information but 
who presents incontrovertible evidence that that information was not a cause of the 
trading will nevertheless be liable under the Rule 10b5-1 test for insider trading if 
the proof does not fit squarely within the rule’s enumerated affirmative defenses.114 
In other words, it appears the rule leaves the door open for one to be found liable for 
insider trading without intent to deceive.115 Such a result seems to fly in the face of 
the courts’ interpretation of Section 10(b) as requiring proof of scienter, and the SEC 
cannot adopt rules that reach beyond the scope of their authorizing statutes.116 
  
                                                 
110 See, e.g., id. at 93 (“In practice, however, the difference between Adler and Rule 
10b5n1 may prove insignificant.”); Stanley Veliotis, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans and 
Insiders’ Incentive to Misrepresent, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 313, 324 (2010) (“In a sense, Rule 
10b5-1 is an attempt to address and codify aspects of . . . [Adler].”). 
111 See August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,727. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Horwich, supra note 83, at 924, 948–49; cf. SEC Interpretations, supra note 92 
(explaining under Question 120.08 a situation where a trader, without knowledge, would still 
be liable even though default on a secured loan was the primary reason for the sale).  
115 See Swanson, supra note 47, at 151–52. 
116 See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 
(1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, . . . the agency[] must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 93 (“The 
SEC cannot adopt rules that go beyond the scope of the statutes authorizing them.”); see also 
Horwich, supra note 83, at 945–49 (discussing the power of the SEC, including an analysis 
under Chevron). 
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Though the SEC remains adamant that its adoption of 10b5-1 has done nothing 
to diminish the element of scienter required for liability under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5,117 it is difficult to reconcile this position with the exclusive nature of the 
available affirmative defenses.118 This has led a number of commentators to question 
the SEC’s authority to adopt Rule 10b5-1.119 Ultimately, however, even if the SEC 
did not exceed its authority when it decided the “use versus possession” question by 
adopting 10b5-1, the resulting compromise walks a fine line that leaves little room 
for the SEC to place further limitations on the affirmative defenses available under 
the rule. Maintaining this delicate compromise will be crucial to any proposed 
reforms to the rule. 
 
III.  INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF TRADING PLANS 
 
Since the adoption of Rule 10b5-1 in 2000, the use of Trading Plans by corporate 
insiders has become “ubiquitous”120 and accounts for billions of dollars of trading 
each year.121 The pervasive use of Trading Plans should not be surprising. There are 
a number of practical advantages to these Plans that make them attractive to insiders, 
and most of them are innocent. But regulators, scholars, and market participants have 
been aware of potential abuses of Rule 10b5-1 since it was first proposed. Indeed, a 
former commissioner of the SEC, Joseph Grundfest, admitted that weaknesses 
inherent to Trading Plans were “well known” by the commission and its staff at the 
time Rule 10b5-1 was adopted.122 Many have complained that Trading Plans are full 
of loopholes123 that offer a de facto “safe harbor” for “unethical behavior.”124  
                                                 
117 August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,727 (“Scienter remains a 
necessary element for liability under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 
thereunder, and Rule 10b5-1 does not change this.”). 
118 See, e.g., Horwich, supra note 83, at 922 (noting that many commentators have 
discredited the SEC’s claims); Swanson, supra note 47, at 196–99 (discussing the duplicitous 
nature of Rule 10b5-1 and noting “the affirmative defenses themselves provide internal 
inconsistencies”); Kevin E. Warner, Note, Rethinking Trades ‘On the Basis Of’ Inside 
Information: Some Interpretations of SEC Rule 10b5-1, 83 B.U. L. REV. 281, 306 (2003) 
(arguing that the SEC’s assurance “seems to conflict with an infallible legal logic”). 
119 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 93 (“The bulk of the evidence . . . raises 
serious doubts as to the validity of Rule 10b5-1.”); Horwich, supra note 83, at 944. 
120 Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. The increase in Trading Plan 
use has occurred among nonexecutive directors as well as among other corporate insiders. 
See Pulliam & Barry, Directors Take Shelter in Trading Plans, supra note 6, at A1 (noting 
that nonexecutive director use of Trading Plans has increased 55% since 2008, compared 
with a 36% increase over the same period by all other corporate insiders). 
121 See Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. 
122 Siconolfi & Eaglesham, supra note 6. 
123 See, e.g., Veliotis, supra note 110, at 328–30; Cooke & Ng, supra note 6; Eaglesham 
& Barry, supra note 6. 
124 Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 6. 
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The goal of this Part of the Article is to situate the current controversy over 
Trading Plans by clarifying the stakes and stakeholders. This is done, first, by 
identifying the benefits that the SEC intended Trading Plans would offer insiders 
and the market in general. Second, the unintended abuses of Trading Plans are 
considered. The different ways in which Trading Plans might be exploited to beat 
the market are identified, and studies indicating that corporate insiders are in fact 
using Trading Plans to beat the market are summarized. Finally, since Trading Plans 
must be approved by firms, this Part concludes by exploring the extent to which 
firms are aware of (and perhaps even complicit in) insiders’ use of Plan trading to 
beat the market. 
 
A.  Intended Uses and Benefits of Trading Plans 
 
Trading Plans allow insiders who are compensated in terms of stock and stock 
options some flexibility to liquidate and diversify without risk of criminal liability. 
In recent years equity compensation has become the predominate component of 
corporate executive pay.125 Since such compensation would be significantly 
diminished in value were significant restrictions placed on insiders’ ability to 
trade,126 there should be little wonder that insiders are anxious to avail themselves 
of these Plans and thereby increase their flexibility to sell the shares with which they 
have been paid.127 And, of course, where the shares are more valuable to employees, 
firms can achieve the same compensation while offering fewer of them; Trading 
Plans, therefore, reduce costs to firms.128 The SEC expected and encouraged such 
efficient use of Trading Plans.129 
                                                 
125 M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REV. 505, 508 
(2011) (Noting that between 1999 and 2008, “the average public company executive earned 
more than half her total pay in the form of stock options or restricted stock”). 
126 See id. at 509 (noting that if insiders are restricted in their ability to sell shares to 
diversify their holdings, “this [restriction] will reduce the value of the shares granted”); see 
also Muth, supra note 52, at 67 (“To enjoy the proceeds of selling stock issued as 
compensation, the executive must be able to liquidate stock while in possession of inside 
information.”). 
127 See Sougata Mukherjee, The Dangerous Game Corporate Executives Are Playing, 
TRIANGLE BIZBLOG (Dec. 11, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/blog/ 
2012/12/the-dangerous-game-corporate.html?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/8ZG-
HKNW. 
128 See Henderson, supra note 125, at 509–10. 
129 Linda Chatman Thomsen, then-director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, 
explained that part of the point of Rule 10b5-1 was “to give executives opportunities to 
diversify or become more liquid through the use of plans with prearranged trades without 
facing the prospect of an insider trading investigation.” Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. 
of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: Opening Remarks Before 
the 15th Annual NASPP Conference (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2007/spch101007lct.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE6-J52G; see also 
Henderson, supra note 125, at 516–17 (noting that 10b5-1 plans were “expected to increase 
opportunities for optimization trading” and “increase the value of insiders’ shares”). 
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Moreover, Trading Plans offer some legal certainty for insiders and firms where 
there was very little before. Prior to the adoption of 10b5-1, general counsel across 
the country faced a predicament every time an officer or director requested to 
purchase or sell company stock.130 As one commentator put it, under the old regime, 
“the insider trading laws provided no means of assuring that a transaction in the 
company’s securities by an insider would escape liability under these laws.”131 
Under Rule 10b5-1, however, the law offers a sanctioned approach that can be 
implemented by firms to moot the question of whether an insider had material 
nonpublic information at the time the transaction takes place.132 
Finally, Trading Plans allow firms to avoid much of the adverse perception 
often associated with insider trades. Prior to Rule 10b5-1, there was always the 
concern that the market would react to insider transactions as an indication of the 
health of the company when, instead, the decision to trade was based on reasons 
unique to the trader (such as portfolio diversification).133 By disclosing that insider 
trading was pursuant to a Trading Plan (established without material nonpublic 
information and well in advance of the actual trade), firms now have a means of 
quelling adverse market reactions and suspicion of illegal trading.134 In addition, 
Trading Plans allow insiders to spread their transactions out into smaller increments 
over a long period of time. Such trades are less likely to attract unwarranted attention 
by the market than would large, dramatic chunks during the narrow trading windows 
following the firm’s quarterly filings (typically the only means of safely liquidating 
shares prior to the advent of 10b5-1 Trading Plans).135 
The practical advantages of Trading Plans listed above are all consistent with 
the SEC’s stated rationale for Rule 10b5-1. But there are grounds for believing that 
another reason, not endorsed by the SEC, offers the principal explanation of Trading 
Plans’ popularity, namely that they provide a de facto safe harbor for insiders to beat 
the market based on material nonpublic information. 
  
                                                 
130 See Donald H. Meiers, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans: A Win-Win Situation, 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 1, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 12908239. 
131 Id. 
132 See id.; Henderson, supra note 125, at 514; Michael S. Melbinger, SEC Announces 
Scrutiny of 10b5-1 Trading Plans, EXEC. COMP. BLOG (Oct. 11, 2007), 
http://www.winston.com/en/executive-compensation-blog/sec-announces-scrutiny-of-10b5 
-1-trading-plans.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3NGB-H7CD. 
133 See, e.g., Romero & Dye, supra note 108, at 901 (“Open market sales by [insiders] 
. . . often attract unwanted attention, due to the perception of many investors that such sales 
may reflect a lack of confidence in the company.”). 
134 Id. at 901–02; see also Meiers, supra note 130 (“A company’s implementation of an 
insider trading policy . . . serves to demonstrate its good faith efforts to ensure that the 
company and its insiders comply with the insider trading laws . . . .”). 
135 See Romero & Dye, supra note 108, at 901–02. 
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B.  Unintended Uses of Trading Plans—Beating the Market 
 
As one commentator noted, until 2005 “most accepted that 10b5-1 plans were 
rarely abused and that scheduled trading was a good system to allow those with 
inside information to trade in their companies’ stocks and diversify their personal 
holdings.”136 In August 2005, however, Professor Alan Jagolinzer shared with the 
Wall Street Journal the preliminary results of a study finding that insiders using 
10b5-1 plans “earned returns on those trades that beat the market on average by 5.6% 
percentage points over a six-month period.”137 According to Jagolinzer’s 
subsequently published study, Trading Plan participants’ sales, which compose the 
majority of Plan transactions, “tend to follow price increases and precede price 
declines, generating statistically significant forward-looking abnormal returns.”138 
The study also shows that Trading Plan “initiations are associated with subsequent 
adverse news disclosure and that early [Trading Plan] termination is associated with 
positive firm performance.”139 According to Jagolinzer, these results indicate that 
some insiders are exploiting “unintended strategic loopholes” in Trading Plans to 
trade strategically.140 
Jagolinzer’s study caught the attention of the SEC. In March 2007, Linda 
Chatman Thomsen, then Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, cited to the 
Jagolinzer study, noting that data reflects that Trading Plans “are being abused in 
various ways to facilitate trading based on inside information.”141 Thomsen then 
warned, “[w]e’re looking at this—hard.”142 Despite this warning, the SEC failed to 
take public action. The issue faded into the background after the market collapse of 
2008, only to reemerge with a series of Wall Street Journal articles in 2012 and 
2013. In November 2012, the Journal ran a front-page article143 sharing the results 
of their own study, which found that among 20,237 executives who traded in their 
own company’s shares within one week of their company’s making news, 1,418 
recorded average gains of 10% (or avoided losses of 10% within one week of their 
trades).144 Only half that number saw their stock move against them by that much. 
The article suggests these abnormal returns can be attributed to the strategic use of 
Trading Plans.145 
  
                                                 
136 Muth, supra note 52, at 81. 
137 Cooke & Ng, supra note 6. 
138 Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 224. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 225. 
141 Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks at the 2007 Corporate Counsel Institute (Mar. 8, 2007), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030807lct2.htm#19, archived at 
http://perma.cc/U6GS-XZR7. 
142 Id. 
143 Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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C.  The Firm’s Role 
 
A recent study by Professor M. Todd Henderson suggests that, not only are 
boards aware that company executives are availing themselves of Trading Plans to 
profit from material nonpublic information, they “bargain” with executives over 
such opportunities when setting executive pay.146 Henderson explains that different 
firms treat insider trading differently. Some firms ban all insider trading, some 
restrict it through blackout periods, and some grant insiders great flexibility to 
trade.147 Henderson points to a prior study reflecting that “firms restricting insiders’ 
ability to trade pay about 13% more in total compensation than firms permitting 
insiders to trade freely.”148 The implication is that some firms offer more liberal 
insider trading policies as a form of “implicit compensation.”149 The value of this 
compensation does not stem entirely from optimization trading (or diversification), 
which was an intended benefit of Trading Plans.150 Henderson’s study shows that a 
reduction in pay correlates to expected returns from informed trading as well: “For 
insiders at firms where prior work shows informed trading is more likely and where, 
in expectation, insiders are likely to earn abnormal returns from this trading, we see 
statistically significant differences in pay compared with insiders at firms where 
prior work shows informed trading is much less likely.”151 In short, “there is 
evidence that firms and executives bargain about insider-trading profits, both from 
optimization trades and informed trades, and that these profits are considered in 
meeting an executive’s reservation wage.”152 Thus, Henderson concludes: 
 
[T]he data suggest[s] that the board was relatively better informed about 
the expected use of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans than the SEC, who wrote 
the rule. If we take the SEC at its word that Rule 10b5-1 was intended to 
encourage optimization trades but not informed trades, then the SEC made 
                                                 
146 Henderson, supra note 125, at 506–07, 537. 
147 Id. at 506–07, 513. 
148 Id. at 515 (citing Darren Roulston, The Relation Between Insider-Trading 
Restrictions and Executive Compensation, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 525, 525–26 (2003)). 
149 See Henderson, supra note 125, at 507 (describing the concept of “implicit 
compensation” as “compensation that is not explicitly disclosed to the public but is 
nevertheless part of the pay bargain between board and executive”). 
150 Diversification is key to risk management in any investment portfolio. When firms 
offer stock as compensation, employees will be exposed to significant risk unless they can 
liquidate those shares and diversify their assets. When an insider trades for the purpose of 
optimizing the balance and diversification of her investment portfolio, rather than to profit 
from material nonpublic information, this is called “optimization trading.” Stock 
compensation is worth less to employees when optimization trading is restricted. See 
Henderson, supra note 125, 509–22. Part of the rationale behind the adoption of 10b5-1(c) 
Trading Plans was to offer employees greater flexibility to liquidate their firm stock for 
purposes of diversification without the risk of insider trading liability. See, e.g., Thomsen, 
supra note 129. 
151 Henderson, supra note 125, at 537. 
152 Id. 
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a mistake—the Rule encourages both types of trades. The evidence . . . 
suggests that boards were aware of this potential in the Rule.153 
 
If companies are complicit in their insiders’ use of material nonpublic 
information to beat the market through the use of Trading Plans, as Henderson’s 
study suggests they are, then what is to be done about it? What is the legal status of 
such implicit compensation? 
 
IV.  DID 10B5-1 LEGALIZE NEW FORMS OF INSIDER TRADING? 
 
In her 2007 speech referenced above, then Director of Enforcement Thomsen 
stated, “if executives are in fact trading on inside information and using a [Trading 
Plan] for cover, they should expect [10b5-1(c)] to provide no defense.”154 But as one 
commentator noted, Thomsen “did not explain how such conduct violated the law 
or under what circumstances an affirmative defense under Rule 10b5-1 would not 
be available.”155 
Just two weeks after the Wall Street Journal published the first article in its 
series on Trading Plans in late 2012, the Manhattan U.S. Attorney’s office launched 
a broad criminal investigation into whether these Plan trades violated securities 
laws.156 But if, as some suggest, many insiders and firms are simply exploiting 
“loopholes” in Trading Plan regulations, then there may be no grounds for 
enforcement action. Instead, if action is to be taken, it must take the shape of legal 
reform. 
This Part addresses the legality of using Plans to trade strategically. While the 
introduction of Trading Plans left much of the landscape of insider trading liability 
unchanged, it (1) made some clearly illegal forms of insider trading more difficult 
to detect and prosecute, and (2) it created new opportunities for insiders to profit 
legally from material nonpublic information. 
 
A.  The Rule Does Not Affect the Status of Traditional Forms of Insider Trading, 
but It Complicates Enforcement 
 
As explained above, for a Trading Plan to qualify for the affirmative defense 
the insider must not be aware of material nonpublic information at the time it is 
adopted. Moreover, Rule 10b5-1 precludes any subsequent influence over the 
content of a qualified Trading Plan once it is established. The rule, therefore, leaves 
no room for traditional insider trading where the insider simply enters a buy or sell 
order based on material nonpublic information. Nevertheless, there is much in the 
rule that makes such traditional insider trading easier to engage in, and more difficult 
to detect and prosecute. 
                                                 
153 Id. at 554. 
154 Thomsen, supra note 141. 
155 Horwich, supra note 83, at 951 n.181. 
156 Pulliam et al., supra note 1, at A1. 
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First, most companies impose blackout periods during which their employees 
are not permitted to trade in firm shares.157 These blackout periods typically precede 
important news release dates throughout the year (e.g., prior to quarterly and annual 
reports).158 But because many companies permit employee trades through pre-
existing Trading Plans to occur during blackout periods,159 insiders in those 
companies gain access to strategic trading opportunities that were not available prior 
to the adoption of 10b5-1.160 
Second, illegal insider trading under the guise of Trading Plans is made easier 
by the fact that the rule places no limits on how soon the first trade may take place 
after a Plan is established.161 For example, an insider could learn of material 
nonpublic information, set up a Trading Plan, and begin trading under the Plan all 
over the course of a few days.162 Such trading unquestionably violates the rule, but 
the very fact that the company can respond to inquiries concerning the trade by 
explaining they were part of a Trading Plan offers prima facie cover and may 
forestall further investigation.163 
Third, there is currently no requirement that firms disclose the establishment of 
Trading Plans by their insiders, much less that they disclose the details of any such 
plans.164 The lack of any disclosure requirement arguably makes illegal Plan trading 
                                                 
157 See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC L. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 13:6.2, at 13-
113 (Practicing L. Inst., 2d. ed. 2006). 
158 Id. 
159 See Henderson, supra note 125, at 514. 
160 See Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 226. 
161 See, e.g., Melbinger, supra note 20 (“Rule 10b5-1 does not impose any minimum 
waiting period between the date that the insider adopts the plan and the date of the first 
trade.”). 
162 Indeed, Jon Hess, CEO of Hess Corporation, established a Trading Plan in February 
2011 and began selling under the Plan on February 7, 2011. See Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ 
Good Luck, supra note 6; Pulliam & Barry, Investors Call for More Disclosure, supra note 
6. Also, on March 9, 2006, Jeffrey Lorberbaum, the chairman and CEO of Mohawk 
Industries Inc., established a Trading Plan. See Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, 
supra note 6. He began selling shares under the Trading Plan just six days later on March 
15. Id. Over the next two weeks, he sold over $10 million in shares. Id. On March 30, which 
was the day after his last sale, the company announced lower than expected earnings and the 
stock dropped 5.4%. Id.  
163 See, e.g., In re Immucor Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:05-CV-2276-WSD, 2006 WL 
3000133, at *18 n.8 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2006) (“[A] clever insider might ‘maximize’ their gain 
from knowledge of an impending price drop . . . and seek to disguise their conduct with a 
10b5-1 plan.”). 
164 In 2002, the SEC proposed a rule that would have required directors and executive 
officers of publicly traded companies to disclose the “adoption, modification or termination” 
of a Trading Plan in a public filing. Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management 
Transactions, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,914 (Apr. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 
249) [hereinafter Form 8-K Disclosure]. The proposed rule change was not, however, 
adopted and appears to have been tabled indefinitely. See Horwich, supra note 83, at 935 
(stating that the proposal “appears to have been consigned to oblivion”). 
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more profitable (because the market will not have an opportunity to adjust the stock 
price in anticipation of the insider’s planned trading), and more difficult to detect. 
Fourth, an insider may adopt multiple, inconsistent Trading Plans to create 
subsequent opportunities for insider trading by Plan termination.165 For example, 
three months prior to an earnings release, an insider might establish two Trading 
Plans: one Plan orders the sale of 10,000 shares on the day before the release and 
one orders the purchase of 10,000 shares on the day before the release. Then, two 
days prior to the release, when the insider possesses material nonpublic information 
about the substance of the release, she can terminate the buy order, or the sell order, 
or both, depending on the nature of the news. Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C)’s prohibition 
against entering into or altering a “corresponding or hedging transaction or position” 
would deprive the insider of the affirmative defense, and this conduct would 
therefore be illegal under the rule.166 Nevertheless, again, the fact that Trading Plans 
need not be disclosed could make it difficult for the SEC or shareholders to detect 
the existence of the inconsistent Trading Plan. 
Fifth, even where firms voluntarily disclose the establishment of Trading Plans, 
the affirmative defense shifts the “awareness” test to the date the Plan was 
established (rather than the execution date of Plan trades). This makes it more 
difficult for the SEC and shareholders to link awareness of material nonpublic 
information to the execution of a suspicious trade.167 Imagine an insider sells shares 
under a Trading Plan (which was established two months prior) on the day before a 
very disappointing earnings release. Under the rule, challenging the trade would 
require proof of awareness two months ago, which would be much more difficult 
than the relatively simple task of proving awareness of the substance of the earnings 
release on the day before it occurred.168 
Ultimately, however, while the adoption of Rule 10b5-1 may have created these 
new opportunities for insiders to profit by trading on material nonpublic information 
and avoid detection, the rule did not change the legal status of any of the conduct 
outlined above—it was all illegal before the rule, and it all remains illegal under the 
rule. Trading Plans did, however, alter the legal status of other forms of strategic 
insider trading. This is the subject of the next section. 
  
                                                 
165 See Melbinger, supra note 20. 
166 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C) (2014); see also Brandon C. Parris, Rule 10b5-
1 Plans: Staying Out of Trouble, 17 ABA BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 2008, available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2008-05-06/parris.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc 
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Rule 10b5-1.”). 
167 See Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 226. 
168 See id. at 224. 
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B.  Loopholes Created by Trading Plans 
 
A legal “loophole” is a gap or ambiguity in a law that allows one to contravene 
the spirit or intent of a law without violating its letter. In the context of insider trading 
regulation, any opportunity for insiders to use material, nonpublic information to 
maximize profits from the purchase or sale of their own company’s shares without 
violating the law would constitute a loophole. It is important to distinguish a 
loophole from a complication or challenge to efficient enforcement (the subject of 
the last section). Insiders exploiting a true loophole are not subject to enforcement. 
The only way to prevent the exploitation of a loophole is to close it with new law. 
The introduction of Trading Plans introduced at least two loopholes in insider 
trading regulation. First, they allow insiders to accelerate or delay the release of news 
to maximize profits for prearranged Plan trades. Second, Trading Plans have created 
an opportunity for insiders to enjoy risk-free options through the selective 
termination of qualified Plans. 
 
1.  Altering Timing of Disclosure 
 
With the adoption of Rule 10b5-1, insiders found that they were no longer 
required to refrain from trading while in possession of material nonpublic 
information, provided those trades were prearranged and comprised by a qualified 
Plan. This created a new opportunity. Since insiders also control the timing of 
disclosures, the rule freed them to time the release of subsequently obtained material 
nonpublic information so as to maximize profits for their prearranged trades.169 A 
number of commentators have identified strategic acceleration or delay of an 
otherwise lawful release of information170 to benefit prearranged Plan transactions 
as a “loophole” created with the adoption of Rule 10b5-1.171 Jagolinzer’s study 
found on average Trading Plan initiation precedes adverse news that moves the stock 
                                                 
169 Id. at 226–27; see also Muth, supra note 52, at 70–71 (explaining that the plan’s 
unusually short timeline allows executives to strategically execute a trade at a time when 
they would have deniability of an untoward motive). 
170 See, e.g., Horwich, supra note 83, at 953. It is assumed that (1) the release is true, 
and (2) that, in the case of delay, an earlier disclosure was not otherwise required by law or 
rule. See Form 8-K Disclosure, supra note 164, (noting current disclosure laws and proposing 
a rule requiring more timely disclosure to better inform investor decisionmaking). 
171 See Veliotis, supra note 110, at 330 (noting that insiders are free to “accelerate the 
release of good news ahead of planned stock sales and to delay the release of bad news until 
after sales are completed”); see also Horwich, supra note 83, at 952–53 (explaining no one 
is “deceived” by a delayed or accelerated disclosure that is in reality a violation of 10b-5); 
Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 226–27 (explaining the plan’s unusually short timeline allows 
executives to strategically execute a trade at a time when they would have deniability of an 
untoward motive); Muth, supra note 52, at 70–73 (discussing that “executives, rather than 
tampering with their plans, will simply adjust the release of news . . . to suit the plan already 
in place,” and providing examples of executives withholding news, changing the timing of 
the news, or manipulating the source of the news). 
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-9.9% by 72.2 days.172 According to Jagolinzer, this indicates insiders are either 
establishing plans while in possession of material nonpublic information or are 
altering the timing of disclosures until after the trades have been planned.173 
Since timing the release of material nonpublic information learned after the 
Plan trades were set is not a subsequent modification to the Trading Plan, such 
conduct does not violate Rule 10b5-1. As one commentator puts it, “[a]s long as an 
insider in possession of any information is ‘toying with’ the timing of the release of 
information and is not adjusting the timing of transactions under the plan, the insider 
is not violating the rule.”174 Moreover, it does not appear that timing the release of 
information to maximize profits for Plan trades is deceptive under Section 10(b) or 
Rule 10b-5.175 After all, who is deceived by the timing of a truthful and otherwise 
lawful disclosure? The point is made most saliently by considering the scenario in 
which true, good news is released early to maximize profits under a Plan sale (or 
bad news is accelerated to maximize a buy order). There is certainly no basis for the 
claim that accelerated disclosure of truthful information is deceptive.176 
Beyond timing the release of news to maximize Trading Plan profits, one 
commentator has noted that insiders can also profit from timing the news itself.177 
Insiders could, for example, push to accelerate or delay the signing of a firm contract 
to benefit Plan trades.178 Since there is rarely a “correct” or clear maximally 
beneficial date on which a contract should be signed, such influence on timing may 
be quite harmless to the firm. If it were not harmless—if, say, the influence on timing 
resulted in less beneficial contractual terms—then there would be a clear breach of 
fiduciary duty. The point is that Rule 10b5-1 opens a new space within the law for 
insiders to tinker with the timing of disclosures to benefit their trading. 
 
2.  Selective Termination of Plans 
 
While Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit insiders from trading based on 
material nonpublic information, they do not prohibit insiders from abstaining from 
trading based on such information. Professor Henry Manne and others have 
highlighted “insider abstention”179 as an example of inconsistency in insider trading 
                                                 
172 Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 235. 
173 Id. at 237. 
174 Veliotis, supra note 110, at 330. 
175 See Horwich, supra note 83, at 952–53. 
176 But even in the case of the delayed release, assuming the actual timing of the 
disclosure is otherwise lawful (e.g., it is not required to be disclosed on Form 8-K or on an 
intervening 10-K or 10Q filing), it is hard to see how the delay itself can be regarded as a 
deception. As Professor Horwich puts it, “Accepting as a given that the actual timing of the 
disclosure is independently lawful, no one is ‘deceived’ by a delayed or accelerated corporate 
disclosure in violation of Rule 10b-5.” Horwich, supra note 83, at 952.  
177 Muth, supra note 52, at 70–71. 
178 See id. at 71 n.33. 
179 I borrow this phrase from Professor Jesse M. Fried. See generally Jesse M. Fried, 
Insider Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455 (2003) (discussing insiders use of material nonpublic 
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law.180 As Manne put it, “[r]efraining from selling stock that would otherwise have 
been sold has exactly the same economic effect on market price as a decision to buy 
that same number of shares.”181 Manne goes on, the  
 
upshot of all this is that people can make abnormal profits in the stock 
market simply by knowing when not to buy and when not to sell. They 
will not make as much perhaps as if they could trade on the information 
more efficiently, but nonetheless they will still make supra-competitive 
returns.182 
 
Professor Jesse Fried has challenged the claim that insider abstention offers a 
market advantage to insiders.183 According to Fried, so long as insiders remain 
unable to actually trade while aware of material nonpublic information, “their ability 
to abstain from trading on such information does not give them an advantage over 
public shareholders.”184 The reason insiders who cannot trade while aware of 
material nonpublic information do not gain an advantage over the market by insider 
abstention is that any gains made by an insider who can abstain from a sale when 
she learns of impending good news will be offset by the fact that she will be unable 
to sell upon learning of impending bad news.185 In short, Fried explains, “the 
insider’s ability to abstain on nonpublic information indicating that a planned trade 
would be unfavorable merely compensates the insider for her inability to proceed 
with a trade after learning nonpublic information indicating that the planned trade 
would be favorable.”186 But Fried recognizes that the adoption of Rule 10b5-1, with 
its affirmative defense for trades made pursuant to prearranged Plans, has upset this 
equilibrium.187 
The SEC has made clear the act of terminating an existing Trading Plan while 
aware of material nonpublic information does not violate the law because it does not 
involve the sale or purchase of a security.188 So, for example, if an insider’s Trading 
Plan provides for the sale of 10,000 shares of her company’s stock on the day before 
an earnings release, and she subsequently learns the company will beat analyst 
expectations, she may terminate the Plan based on this information.189 Fried points 
out that the ability to trade while aware of material nonpublic information under 
                                                 
information to abstain from trading and avoid violating Rule 10b-5). 
180 See e.g., Anderson, supra note 25, at 26; Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and 
Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO J. 933, 933–35 (1985). 
181 Manne, supra note 180, at 938. 
182 Id. 
183 See Fried, supra note 179, at 456–58. 
184 Id. at 458. 
185 See id. at 455–58. 
186 Id. at 467. 
187 Id. at 486–87. 
188 See SEC Interpretations, supra note 92 (see Question 120.17 and accompanying 
text). 
189 See Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 227; Veliotis, supra note 110, at 329. 
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Rule 10b5-1, when combined with the ability to terminate a Trading Plan while 
aware of material nonpublic information, introduces a previously nonexistent 
opportunity for profit from insider abstention.190 
A number of other commentators have identified the ability to selectively 
terminate Trading Plans based on material nonpublic information as a loophole in 
Rule 10b5-1.191 Insiders can enhance their strategic use of Trading Plan terminations 
by basing Plan trades on nonpublic information that is not material at the time the 
plan is established, but which may ripen into material information at the time the 
trades are scheduled to take place.192 If the information does not pan out as expected, 
the insider may just terminate the plan. In effect, the ability to terminate Trading 
Plans based on material nonpublic information allows insiders to create a cost-free 
option to buy or sell.193 Indeed, Jagolinzer’s study found that 46% of a random 
sample of Trading Plan terminations of sell orders preceded positive news events for 
the company, while only 11% of sell order terminations preceded negative news 
events.194 
Of course, the SEC has qualified its approval of strategic Trading Plan 
terminations by warning that (1) early termination may deprive the insider of the 
affirmative defense for prior transactions under the Plan,195 and (2) frequent early 
terminations may raise concerns over whether the insider established any new 
Trading Plans in good faith.196 These qualifications appear to significantly diminish 
the impact of the selective termination loophole because they seem to preclude the 
regular use of selective termination as an investment strategy. The insider may be 
able to avoid liability for the strategic termination of a single Plan trade, but at the 
price of potentially undermining the affirmative defense for any trades executed 
under the terminated or subsequent Plans. There are, however, two points to be made 
about this SEC guidance. First, it is phrased in vague terms that employ the 
                                                 
190 See Fried, supra note 179, at 456–57. 
191 See Horwich, supra note 83, at 951; Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 227; Veliotis, supra 
note 110, at 329; Cooke & Ng, supra note 6 (quoting Harvard Business School Professor, 
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noncommittal language, “could affect the availability”197 and “would be relevant to 
a determination.”198 Second, the warnings were issued as Compliance and 
Disclosure Interpretations, which merely reflect the “views of the staff” and are not 
“rules, regulations, or statements of the Commission.”199 While it would certainly 
be risky and unwise to ignore this guidance in practice, it is not binding on the courts 
and it certainly warrants close scrutiny. The next two sections test the legitimacy of 
this SEC guidance. 
 
C.  Does the Constraint of Good Faith Close the Loopholes? 
 
Again, Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(ii) provides that the affirmative defense of a Trading 
Plan is only available when the Plan was entered into “in good faith and not as part 
of a plan or scheme to evade the prohibitions of this [rule].”200 Focusing first on 
selective termination, how might the selective termination of a Plan trade put an 
insider on the wrong side of this provision? As noted above, the SEC makes it clear 
that the termination of a Plan based on material nonpublic information does not 
violate the rule because it does not involve the purchase or sale of a security. But, as 
noted above, the SEC also implies that such a termination may undermine the 
affirmative defense for prior and subsequent Plan trades. The idea must be that 
selective termination may be evidence that the insider understood at the time she 
established the plan that she would terminate the Plan if she later acquired material 
nonpublic information that a prearranged Plan trade would be disadvantageous. 
Since such a “plan or scheme” would evade the general goal of Rule 10b-5 by 
allowing insiders to systematically gain a market advantage through the use of 
material nonpublic information, the Trading Plan would never have been qualified 
and the affirmative defense would not therefore be available for any trades that 
actually took place under the Plan. Similarly, if the creation of a new Plan after a 
selective termination were part of the same “plan or scheme,” none of the trades 
under that Plan would qualify for the affirmative defense either. Of course, even on 
this account, the affirmative defense would still stand if the thought of terminating 
based on material nonpublic information only occurred to the insider after the Plan 
was established. 
If this is indeed the qualification the SEC has in mind, how would it play out in 
practice? Imagine the CEO of ABC, Inc. sets up a Trading Plan to sell off 100,000 
shares of her ABC stock to diversify her portfolio. The Plan calls for the sale of 
50,000 shares on the next two Fridays. When she sets up this Plan, the CEO has no 
material nonpublic information, but she intends to cancel the Plan if she 
subsequently learns ABC will release negative market-moving information prior to 
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any of the scheduled trades. The Thursday before the first Plan trade is to be 
executed, the CEO learns ABC will miss its previously published earnings guidance 
by 10% and that this information will be released next Thursday during a regularly 
scheduled earnings call. While aware of this information, the CEO allows the first 
trade to go through, but then cancels the Plan to prevent the second trade from being 
executed. The CEO’s share sale on the Friday before the announcement catches the 
SEC’s attention and there is an inquiry. In her voluntary interview with the SEC, the 
CEO candidly explains the trading strategy outlined above, including the fact that 
she established the Plan with the intention to terminate it if she learned market-
moving bad news would be announced prior to a Plan trade. Should the CEO be 
found liable for insider trading? 
Based on the staff’s interpretations, it might be expected the SEC would find 
the CEO entered into the Trading Plan in bad faith, as part of a “plan or scheme to 
evade” the prohibitions of Rule 10b-5. Consequently, the CEO’s Plan would not 
afford her an affirmative defense. Since the CEO was “aware” of material nonpublic 
information at the time the first Plan trade was executed, and since no affirmative 
defense is available, she would be liable for insider trading with respect to this sale 
pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 under this interpretation of Rule 10b5-1. 
But this logic is troubling. First, since the SEC admits the termination of an 
order based on material nonpublic information is not a violation of Section 10(b) or 
Rule 10b-5, how can one’s intent to selectively terminate a transaction at the time a 
Trading Plan is established constitute a plan or scheme to evade Section 10(b) or 
Rule 10b-5? Second, given the fact that it is perfectly legal to terminate a Plan based 
on material nonpublic information, anyone setting up a plan would be irrational not 
to expect to terminate the Plan if it turns out that subsequently revealed material 
nonpublic information will make going through with the trades financially 
disastrous. Third, note the odd result of depriving the CEO of the affirmative defense 
post hoc. The CEO made the first Plan sale solely for the purpose of diversifying her 
portfolio holdings. She did not use the material nonpublic information in her 
possession to gain an unfair advantage over the counterparty to this trade. 
Nevertheless, since she was “aware” of the material nonpublic information at the 
time the trade took place, she would be liable pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 without any 
evidence of scienter. 
Of course the SEC’s objection to the practice of selective termination might be 
more general. It might be that such a plan or scheme betrays bad faith in that it 
violates the “spirit,” if not the letter of the law, and that this alone offers grounds for 
depriving an insider of the affirmative defense under Rule 10b5-1(c). The SEC has 
not issued any guidance or offered any interpretation of Rule 10b5-1 as it pertains 
to accelerating or delaying the release of information to benefit Plan trades,201 but a 
similar argument might be expected in that context. In short, the logic may be that 
                                                 
201 In Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 156 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 312 
Fed. App’x 400 (2d Cir. 2009), the plaintiffs raised the issue of the timing of disclosure to 
fit Plan transactions, but the court dismissed the case on other grounds without addressing 
the timing question. See Veliotis, supra note 110, at 340–41. 
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insofar as both selective termination and timing the release of information offer 
insiders opportunities to use Trading Plans to increase their trading profits from the 
use of material nonpublic information, they violate the spirit of Section 10(b) and 
therefore reflect bad faith. 
If this is indeed the SEC’s position, it defines “good faith” based on the SEC’s 
own expansive interpretations of the goals of Section 10(b). There is, however, 
ample evidence of disagreement between the SEC and the federal courts over 
precisely what the “spirit” of the prohibition of insider trading found in Section 10(b) 
entails. 
 
D.  The “Spirit” Versus “Letter” of Insider Trading Law 
 
The courts’ rejection of the SEC’s position in the “use versus possession” debate 
in Adler and Smith offers just one example of many in which federal courts have 
demonstrated a readiness to reign in the SEC’s aggressive interpretations of Section 
10(b) in the context of insider trading. Most notably, the Supreme Court rejected the 
SEC’s expansive interpretation of Section 10(b) as a mandate for parity of 
information in the markets. In In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,202 the SEC maintained 
that one of the “principal elements” on which Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 insider 
trading liability rests is “the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes 
advantage of [material nonpublic information] knowing it is unavailable to those 
with whom he is dealing.”203 The SEC’s position that equal access to information 
was a principal rationale behind insider trading liability was picked up by the federal 
courts in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,204 and then persisted for the better part of 
two decades before the Supreme Court explicitly rejected it in Chiarella v. United 
States.205 In Chiarella, the Court held the SEC’s formulation of the broad parity of 
information rule, “which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty 
arises from a specific relationship between two parties, . . . should not be undertaken 
absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.”206 The Court then reaffirmed 
its rejection of the SEC’s equal access rule three years later in Dirks v. SEC.207 
  
                                                 
202 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
203 Id. at 912. 
204 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding “Rule [10b-5] is based in policy on the 
justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal 
exchanges have relatively equal access to material information”). 
205 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
206 Id. at 233. 
207 463 U.S. 646, 656 n.15 (1983) (“As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession 
of nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; only a specific 
relationship does that.”). 
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Chiarella and Dirks significantly diminished the SEC’s enforcement mandate. 
Since those decisions, the SEC has had some success208 and some failure209 in its 
attempts to regain the ground it lost. But regardless, it remains the case that the SEC 
and the courts often find themselves at odds with respect to Section 10(b)’s mandate, 
and therefore the scope of insider trading liability. Consequently, the SEC’s 
understanding of “good faith” and conformity with the “spirit” of the law of insider 
trading is often quite different from that of the courts. Given the SEC’s obvious 
organizational incentives to continue to press for a broader mandate,210 this gap 
between interpretations is likely to persist. Since it is by no means clear what is 
entailed by the “spirit” of Section 10(b) and therefore Rule 10b-5, there are serious 
moral and constitutional problems with turning to so vague a ground in defining the 
scope of civil and criminal liability (and available defenses) under the “good faith” 
provision of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(ii). 
One of the crucial moral presuppositions of Western liberal jurisprudence is the 
principle of legality (sometimes expressed in the Latin phrase, Nullum crimen sine 
lege).211 The principle requires that “there must be no crime or punishment except 
in accordance with fixed, reasonably specific, and fairly ascertainable preestablished 
law.”212 The principle gives expression to the basic moral intuition that individuals  
 
                                                 
208 For example, after Chiarella, the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3, which imposes strict 
liability for trading based on material nonpublic information in connection with a tender 
offer, to close the enforcement left open by the Court’s decision in that case. 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14e-3 (2014). Rule 14e-3 was later upheld in O’Hagan. See United States v. O’Hagan, 
521 U.S. 642, 666–67 (1997) (holding that “to the extent relevant to this case” the SEC “did 
not exceed its authority” in adopting 14e-3). However, as Professor Swanson points out, by 
using the language “to the extent relevant to this case,” the O’Hagan Court qualified its 
endorsement of the rule, leaving open whether the Court “would uphold Rule 14e-3 in a case 
involving a trader who otherwise owes no disclosure obligation.” Swanson, supra note 47, 
at 180. The Supreme Court in O’Hagan also endorsed the SEC’s proposed misappropriation 
theory of liability. 521 U.S. at 652–53, 659. 
209 The courts’ rejection of the SEC’s preferred knowing possession standard in Adler 
and Smith was addressed above. See also SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 948 (S.D. 
Ohio 2004) (rejecting an attempt by the SEC to revive tipper/tippee liability where the tipper 
does not personally benefit from the use of the material nonpublic information); SEC v. 
Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (rejecting theory that insider trading 
liability could turn on information that was overheard without the insider’s knowledge). 
210 In summarizing the “public choice” theory as an explanation for the regulation of 
insider trading, Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge notes, “as do all government agencies, the 
SEC desired to enlarge its jurisdiction and enhance its prestige. Administrators can maximize 
their salaries, power, and reputation by maximizing the size of their agency’s budget. A 
vigorous enforcement program . . . is surely an effective means of attracting political support 
for larger budgets.” BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 148; see also MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 816–57 (1995) (describing the challenges presented 
by the SEC’s limited resources for enforcement of insider trading laws). 
211 See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 195 (1977). 
212 Id. 
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should have fair notice that criminal sanctions will be imposed for certain conduct 
so they can plan their lives to avoid those sanctions. 
This sound moral principle finds expression in the U.S. Constitution through 
the prohibition of ex post facto laws213 and through the due process clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. So, for example, a criminal statute that contains 
terms that are too vague to identify with precision the conduct that is proscribed may 
be struck down as violating due process of law.214 In Connally v. General 
Construction Company,215 the Supreme Court held that a law is unconstitutionally 
vague when a person of “common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning.”216 
Some scholars complain that the criminal prohibition of insider trading suffers 
from such vagueness.217 Indeed, Steven Cohen, founder of SAC Capital Advisors, 
LP, and the subject of a recent high-profile insider trading investigation, raised the 
issue in a recent deposition: “[i]t’s my belief that the rule [against insider trading] is 
vague, and therefore, you can interpret the rule any way—you know, with—as a 
lawyer, you can probably interpret it in lots of different ways.”218 Professor Homer 
Kripke once noted that “fraud” in Rule 10b-5 has “come to mean anything that the 
SEC dislikes because by picking cases in which it can dramatically describe the 
facts, the SEC hopes that the facts will carry the law.”219 This raises another concern. 
As Justice O’Connor explained in Kolender v. Lawson,220 
 
the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine “is not actual notice, but 
the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” 
Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal 
statute may permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, 
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.”221  
 
The point here is not to make the strong claim that the current insider trading 
enforcement regime should be struck down as unconstitutionally vague, but rather 
to suggest that its lack of statutory definition raises this specter and, at a minimum, 
                                                 
213 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10. 
214 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (vagrancy 
ordinance found to be unconstitutionally vague). 
215 269 U.S. 385 (1926). 
216 Id. at 391. 
217 See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Manne’s Insider Trading Thesis and Other Failures of 
Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945, 949 (1985). 
218 Greg Ferrell, SAC’s Cohen May Face SEC Suit as Deposition Hurts Case, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=web 
port_news&tkr=MCD:US,PFE:US,WMT:US&tkr2=PFE:US&sid=atYHrhzi7XIQ, 
archived at http://perma.cc/CY9K-KLNW. 
219 Kripke, supra note 217, at 949. 
220 461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
221 Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574–75 (1974)). 
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subjects it to moral scrutiny under the principle of legality. In light of this fact, the 
SEC should be careful not to rely on creative interpretations of “good faith” (e.g., 
enlisting the “spirit” of a law that has yet to be defined by statute and which is 
disputed by regulators and courts) to deprive insiders of the Trading Plan affirmative 
defense when they have otherwise complied with the letter of the rule.  
 
V.  CANNOT SOLVE PROBLEM BY TWEAKING CURRENT RULE 
 
To take stock, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-1 in part to resolve the “use versus 
possession” debate and to bring clarity to the scope of insider trading liability. By 
adopting the “awareness” test, the SEC preserved much of its preferred knowing 
possession standard, but, in a nod to the decisions in Adler and Smith (and to the 
Section 10(b) requirement of scienter), the affirmative defense for Trading Plans 
was included in the rule as a compromise. In addition to the anticipated benefits, the 
introduction of Trading Plans had some unintended consequences: (1) certain 
aspects of Trading Plans allow the insider to more easily avoid detection and 
enforcement of illegal insider trading, and (2) the Plans created loopholes that 
arguably allow insiders to legally benefit from the use of material nonpublic 
information. And studies have confirmed that insiders who use Trading Plans are 
beating the market. 
As the issue of Trading Plans continues to draw media attention, pressure 
mounts for the SEC to take action. But what action should be taken? Two options 
are before them. First, the SEC could attempt to address the issue through vigorous 
enforcement. Second, the SEC could seek to amend the law by statute or rule change. 
The recent announcements of investigations indicate the first option, enforcement, 
will be part of the strategy. But while aggressive enforcement can elevate the risks 
to would-be violators of the rules (perhaps compensating for the ways in which 
Trading Plans have made violations more difficult to detect and enforce), it cannot 
address the loopholes in the law. Moreover, the current state of uncertainty as to 
what conduct actually constitutes a violation of insider trading law generates moral 
and constitutional problems that would only be exasperated by aggressive 
enforcement of purported Trading Plan abuse as a common law crime. 
Consequently, it appears the second option, actual reform of the law of insider 
trading through statute or rule change, is the most appropriate and most likely path 
forward. Part VI outlines the reform advocated here. But before turning to this, it 
will be useful to explain why some solutions that have already been floated by 
scholars and market participants will not work. 
 
A.  Problems with Some Suggested “Tweaks” to Rule 10b5-1 
 
The key to any successful reform of the existing 10b5-1 framework will be to 
maintain the rule’s precarious compromise between the SEC’s preferred 
“possession” test and the Section 10(b) requirement of scienter. The pressure for 
change focuses on the affirmative defense for Trading Plans, but it is precisely the 
availability of this defense that allowed the SEC to navigate the strait between the 
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“possession” test and the “use” test adopted by the courts in Adler and Smith. In 
short, any limitations imposed on the availability of the Trading Plan affirmative 
defense must be careful not to undermine the already controversial claim by the SEC 
that the rule respects the Section 10(b) element of scienter. 
A number of changes to the affirmative defense for Trading Plans have been 
suggested. These include requiring varying degrees of disclosure, limiting the ability 
of Plan users to terminate their Plans, precluding Plan transactions during company-
imposed blackout periods, prohibiting multiple or overlapping Plans, and imposing 
a mandatory delay between establishment and trading under a Plan. Some of these 
suggestions are more helpful than others, but none of them, individually or taken 
together, will be sufficient to fully address the issue. 
 
1.  Requiring Disclosure 
 
As noted above, there is currently no disclosure requirement for Trading Plans. 
Some have suggested the SEC adopt a rule requiring that firms and insiders disclose 
the establishment of Trading Plans, as well as any amendments, terminations, and 
transactions under them.222 The SEC has indicated that while it is open to a new rule 
requiring insiders to disclose Trading Plans ahead of trades,223 “there would need to 
be careful consideration of the costs and benefits.”224 A rule requiring disclosure of 
Trading Plans was proposed by the SEC in 2002 and was dropped.225 The 2002 
proposal would have required companies to disclose the establishment of Trading 
Plans by directors or executive officers on a Form 8-K. Although the proposed rule 
would not have required disclosure of the specifics of the trades comprised by a 
newly established Plan,226 more detailed information would have been required with 
respect to Plan terminations or modifications.227 The stated rationale for the 
proposed rule change was that “current reports disclosing that a director or executive 
                                                 
222 See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney to Mary Jo White, supra note 19; see also 
Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 6 (noting that “Nejat Seyhun, a finance professor at the 
University of Michigan, believes the SEC should require companies to file plans with the 
agency and disclose details of them—including changes and cancellations—to investors”). 
223 Pulliam & Barry, Investors Call for More Disclosure, supra note 6 (“If [the SEC] 
heard significant calls for reproposal of [the pre-trade disclosure] requirement, the 
commission certainly could take it up again in the future . . . .”). 
224 Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. 
225 Horwich, supra note 83, at 934–35 (discussing that although the SEC proposed that 
certain plans should be disclosed on Form 8-K, that proposal was “never formally 
withdrawn,” and the disclosure proposal “appears to have been consigned to oblivion”). 
226 Form 8-K Disclosure, supra note 164, at 19,921. Upon establishment of a Plan, the 
company would be required to report the director or executive officer’s name and title, the 
date on which the Trading Plan was established, and a description of the Trading Plan 
including its duration, the aggregate number of securities to be purchased or sold, and the 
name of the agent with whom the Plan was set up. Id. 
227 Id. Upon termination or modification of a plan, the company would be required to 
disclose the date the termination or modification took place, and, in the case of a 
modification, its description in addition to the name and title of the insider. Id. 
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officer has entered into, modified or terminated a Rule 10b5-1 [Plan] . . . may 
provide investors with more extensive disclosure of potentially useful information 
as to management’s views of the performance and prospects of the company.”228 It 
is unclear why the SEC dropped this proposal to require disclosure, but it raises a 
number of concerns. 
To begin, it is hard to reconcile the SEC’s stated rationale for the disclosure 
requirement, offering “potentially useful information as to management’s views of 
the performance and prospects of the company,”229 with the function of Trading 
Plans as an affirmative defense. Trading Plans only offer an affirmative defense to 
10b-5 liability because the rulemakers recognized insiders will sometimes want to 
trade their company shares for reasons that have absolutely nothing to do with the 
future “performance and prospects”230 of the company (e.g., diversification, or 
paying a child’s college tuition). Moreover, an insider must be free of material 
nonpublic information when establishing the Plan. Thus, as one commenter on the 
rule put it, where the rule is being followed, “any subsequent transactions effected 
pursuant to a 10b5-1 plan or arrangement does not reflect the officer or director’s 
view at that time regarding the business or prospects of the company.”231 So for the 
disclosure requirement to make sense (i.e., for it to ensure the disclosure of “useful 
information” to investors), it must presume that insiders will violate the law on a 
regular basis. Such a disclosure requirement reduces to incoherence. 
Indeed, some have expressed the concern that required Trading Plan disclosure 
would generate more confusion than clarity in the market.232 For example, disclosure 
of a large Plan sale by the CEO of a company may create the impression among 
investors that this reflects the CEO’s assessment of the future prospects of the 
company. But, assuming the CEO is complying with the rule (and is not basing the 
decision to sell on material nonpublic information), this impression would be false. 
Nevertheless, the false impression could set off a selling spree that hurts other 
investors as well as the CEO.233 Moreover, if the amount of stock to be bought or 
sold under the Trading Plan is relatively small in comparison with the insider’s 
overall holdings, disclosure “may give the transaction(s) more visibility than 
warranted.”234 Finally, given that advance disclosure of a Trading Plan sale (or 
purchase) could impact the price of the stock, investor expectations may be built 
around the Plan. If no trades end up being executed under the Plan (either because 
the undisclosed Plan transaction price is  
 
                                                 
228 Id. at 19,916. 
229 Form 8-K Disclosure, supra note 164, at 19,925. 
230 See id. at 19,915. 
231 E-mail from Cary Klafter, Intel Corp., to Jonathan J. Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (June 24, 2002, 2:51 PM), available at, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902 
/srvirkar1.txt, archived at http://perma.cc/FFQ2-7UNB. 
232 See, e.g., Horwich, supra note 83, at 940 (suggesting required disclosure of 10b5-1 
plans could have undesirable effects including artificial depression in stock prices). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 941. 
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never hit, or because the Plan is modified or terminated before a transaction takes 
place), then disappointed investors may cry foul.235 
But the above problems with requiring disclosure of Trading Plans presume that 
insiders are generally playing by the rules. There is little doubt that the current 
pressure to require advance disclosure of Trading Plans stems from overwhelming 
evidence of abuse and the thought that disclosure may have a mitigating effect. 
There is, however, an irony in this justification for disclosure. A recent study 
indicates that abnormal returns are significantly higher for transactions under 
voluntarily disclosed Trading Plans (particularly those that provide specific Plan 
details) than for those that are not disclosed.236 The explanation offered for this 
phenomenon is that “disclosure provides value to a ‘hiding in plain sight’ strategy 
because of its incremental legal protection,” given that courts are likely to credit 
voluntary disclosure as evidence of legal compliance.237 Thus, it appears requiring 
disclosure would only be effective in compelling disclosure from those firms whose 
insiders are not abusing Trading plans. 
 
2.  Restricting Plan Termination 
 
Many have suggested the best way to address the problem of selective Plan 
termination as a means for insiders to beat the market is to impose restrictions on 
Plan terminations. Professor Jesse Fried has suggested the rule be changed to require 
that insiders wait until they are unaware of any material nonpublic information 
before they are permitted to terminate their Plans.238 According to Fried, since most 
plans involve selling small amounts of shares on a regular basis, “there should be 
few liquidity or diversification costs to preventing insiders from canceling 
prearranged trades when they have information indicating that the trades would be 
unfavorable.”239 Others have suggested that the rule be revised to simply lock 
insiders into Trading Plans for a fixed period (e.g., for six months or a year) before 
they can terminate, or even for the entire duration of the Plan (similar to restrictions 
on flexible health care spending accounts).240 
                                                 
235 Id. at 942. 
236 See M. Todd Henderson et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Can Disclosure Enhance 
Insiders’ Trade Returns? 20 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 411, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1137928, archived at 
http://perma.cc/275J-S3MA. 
237 See id. 
238 Fried, supra note 179, at 491. 
239 Id. 
240 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, The Fine Line Between Legal, and Illegal, Insider 
Trading, N.Y. TIMES DEAL BOOK (Dec. 10, 2012, 3:17 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/the-fine-line-between-legal-and-illegal-insider-
trading/?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/3ABK-33VW; Sougata Mukherjee, The 
Dangerous Game Corporate Executives Are Playing, TRIANGLE BIZBLOG (Dec. 11, 2012, 
2:29 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/blog/2012/12/the-dangerous-game-
corporate.html?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/6MYF-CT25 (“[E]xecutives should 
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There would, of course, be costs associated with such restrictions on the power 
to terminate. As explained above, any limitations placed on insiders’ use of their 
company shares make them less valuable to the insider, and, consequently, more 
shares must be offered by the firm to achieve the same compensation. The 
restrictions would therefore come at a cost to the firm and its shareholders. 
Moreover, some have suggested that selective termination provides additional 
efficiency benefits by aligning the interests of management and shareholders 
because “enabling managers to abstain from selling on good news allows them to 
profit fully from the value that they create for shareholders.”241 Others have 
suggested that allowing insiders to trade on material nonpublic information may help 
prevent accounting fraud because it offers insiders a means of separating their 
personal solvency from the company’s reported performance.242 This argument 
would apply in the context of selective Plan terminations as well. 
But economic considerations aside, the real problem with revising Rule 10b5-
1 to restrict or preclude Plan terminations centers on the limits of the SEC’s 
rulemaking authority. While the SEC has a history of expansive interpretations and 
aggressive enforcement of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, since Chiarella, the courts 
have been adamant that the SEC’s mandate is not so expansive as to outlaw all 
profits from material nonpublic information—only those that involve some form of 
fraudulent manipulation or deception in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security. And, as explained above, selective termination does not appear to involve 
the purchase or sale of a security. One might respond, however, that the suggestion 
is not to make selective termination an insider trading violation, but rather it is to 
make refraining from termination (or refraining from termination based on material 
nonpublic information—depending on which suggested revision to the rule is 
followed) one more element that must be satisfied to avail oneself of the affirmative 
defense for Trading Plans. There are a number of points to be made here. 
First, recall that the Trading Plan affirmative defense was only included in Rule 
10b5-1 to soften the harshness of its awareness test; without the affirmative defense, 
the rule would have transformed insider trading into the practical equivalent of a 
strict liability offense.243 Without the affirmative defense, any trade made by an 
insider while merely aware of material nonpublic information would incur liability. 
Assume Rule 10b5-1(c) is revised to deny the affirmative defense for Plan trades 
when that Plan is terminated based on material nonpublic information. Now imagine 
the CEO of XYZ Inc. sets up a Trading Plan (while unaware of material nonpublic 
information) to liquidate some of her XYZ shares to pay for her daughter’s college 
tuition. The Plan calls for the sale of 1,000 shares on the twenty-eighth of every 
month for the next six months. A week after the Plan is established, she learns of 
                                                 
not be allowed to terminate the plan before six months or 12 months”). 
241 Fried, supra note 179, at 491 n.68. 
242 See Robert E. Wagner, Gordon Gekko to the Rescue?: Insider Trading as a Tool to 
Combat Accounting Fraud, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 973, 1000–05 (2011). 
243 Indeed, some have argued—even with the affirmative defense in place—to the 
extent that Rule 10b5-1 allows for liability without deception, it already imposes strict 
liability. See e.g., Swanson, supra note 47, at 151–52. 
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negative material nonpublic information about XYZ Inc. She allows the first three 
trades under the Plan to be executed while she is aware of this information. She then 
learns that XYZ will disclose this negative information the day prior to her fourth 
scheduled trade under the Plan. She terminates the Plan on the basis of this material 
nonpublic information (recall, the SEC admits such a termination is legal and 
violates no laws). Under the proposed amendment to the rule, the result would be 
liability for three instances of illegal insider trading. The fact that the Plan was set 
up in good faith and without awareness of material nonpublic information would be 
irrelevant to the CEO’s liability. Moreover, no proof that the first three transactions 
took place solely to pay for her daughter’s college tuition would be available in her 
defense because she was aware of material nonpublic information when they 
occurred and the affirmative defense is unavailable. Such a result would be difficult 
to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s recognition of the requirement of scienter for 
violations of §10(b), and with the holdings in Adler and Smith. 
Second, if the rule were revised to preclude the Trading Plan affirmative 
defense where a Plan is terminated based on material nonpublic information, would 
the Rule 10b5-1 “awareness” test also apply to this determination? If so, then assume 
all the facts are the same as in the example above, but instead of terminating her Plan 
to avoid selling after the release of bad news, the CEO terminated the Plan solely 
because she just learned her daughter decided to ditch college and join the Air Force. 
Here, under this proposed amendment, because the CEO happened to be aware of 
material nonpublic information when she terminated the Plan (though she terminated 
for other reasons), she would nevertheless be liable for three counts of insider 
trading. Or imagine the result when an insider needs to, say, terminate a purchase 
order under a Plan to insure that she has adequate funds to pay for her husband’s 
emergency heart surgery. Is she to be liable for any prior Plan trades made while she 
was aware of material nonpublic information? Again, such odd results cannot be 
reconciled with the requirement of fraudulent deception or manipulation required 
for Section 10(b) liability. But worse, there is absolutely nothing that is even 
conceivably wrongful with the insider’s conduct in either of these two cases. Note 
also that amending the rule to simply preclude Plan terminations altogether 
(regardless of whether the insider is aware of material nonpublic information) would 
render the same problematic result whenever insiders have legitimate personal 
reasons for wishing to terminate a Plan. With any such restriction in place, insiders 
would risk incurring criminal liability for conduct that is in no way wrongful. 
Finally, one might argue that, even if an absolute restriction on Plan 
terminations is not the answer, the rule should be modified to preclude companies 
and insiders from making frequent modifications or terminations of Plans. But it is 
hard to imagine how such a rule might look. The SEC’s current interpretation of the 
rule that warns selective termination may call into question the good faith basis of 
the Plan is clearly designed to limit frequent terminations. But, in addition to lacking 
clarity, it has already been argued that this interpretation also leads to unacceptable 
results.244 
                                                 
244 See supra Part IV.C. 
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3.  Problems for Other Proposed Reforms 
 
The following reforms to Rule 10b5-1 provide potential means to improving 
enforcement and detection of violations under the current rule. First, firms and 
insiders “should only be permitted . . . to buy or sell securities during company-
adopted trading windows, which typically open after the announcement of the 
financial results from a recently completed fiscal quarter and close prior to the close 
of the next fiscal quarter.”245 Second, as noted above, there is currently no rule about 
how long an insider must wait between establishing a Plan and trading under it. 
Some have proposed a mandatory delay between Plan establishment and the first 
trade under the Plan.246 Mandatory delays ranging from three247 to six248 months have 
been suggested. The purpose of these two suggested rule changes would be to make 
it difficult for insiders to disguise illegal trades based on material nonpublic 
information behind Plan Trades. 
One problem with these suggestions is that they will significantly decrease 
insiders’ flexibility in using Trading Plans for legitimate purposes. As explained 
above, any restriction on insiders’ ability to trade their shares will make the 
company’s shares less valuable to insiders, which will in turn present a cost to firms. 
Moreover, these suggestions will make it more difficult for insiders to avail 
themselves of the Trading Plan affirmative defense to effect legitimate trades. 
Imagine an insider has a stock option that will vest in one month and knows that she 
will need to execute the option at that time to make a balloon payment on her house. 
This insider is not aware of material nonpublic information at the time, but she 
knows she may be aware of such information in one month. She would like to 
establish a Trading Plan to execute the options when they vest in one month, but she 
would be prevented from doing so if the rule were changed to, for instance, impose 
a mandatory three- or six-month delay. With such restrictions on the use of Trading 
Plans in place, the insider will have to wait the month. If she becomes aware of 
material nonpublic information when her options vest, she will be forced to choose 
between executing the options and incurring insider trading liability or foreclosure 
on her home. Again, it is difficult to see how the requirement of scienter under 
Section 10(b) could be reconciled with this harsh result. Thus, any benefits of these 
suggested reforms in terms of deterring illegal insider trading must be balanced 
against the risk that their potentially harsh application may not survive judicial 
scrutiny. 
Another suggested change has been to preclude multiple or overlapping 
Trading Plans.249 This change would be directed at preventing the practice of 
                                                 
245 Letter from Jeff Mahoney to Mary Jo White, supra note 19. 
246 See id.; Mukherjee, supra note 240. 
247 See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney to Mary Jo White, supra note 19. 
248 See, e.g., Mukherjee, supra note 240. 
249 See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney to Mary Jo White, supra note 19. 
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hedging one Trading Plan with another.250 Since such hedging is already prohibited 
by the rule, the change, like the last two, would amount to nothing more than an 
attempt to make it more difficult to violate the law. And, also like the last two 
proposed changes, any benefits in the form of enhanced detection and enforcement 
of illegal conduct will have to be weighed against the decrease in flexibility to 
insiders and firms in using Trading Plans for legitimate purposes. There are a 
number of legitimate reasons for having multiple overlapping Plans. For example, 
some have suggested that any Plan with a duration less than twelve months is 
“aggressive.”251 Thus, if the typical Plan is one year or longer, it only stands to 
reason that, as more near-term investment needs arise, an insider may wish to set up 
a second consistent Plan to address those needs without having to terminate an 
existing Plan, particularly if termination is likely to raise suspicion among 
regulators. The limitation would become more suffocating still to insiders if it were 
paired with restrictions on the termination of Plans. If an insider has no means of 
terminating an existing Plan, and cannot establish an overlapping Plan, the insider 
is out of luck in the event of a change in investment strategy, or worse, in a personal 
or family emergency. Again, such restrictions may force the insider to trade outside 
of a Plan, risking harsh results under the Rule 10b5-1 awareness test. 
 
4.  Need for Regime Change 
 
Again, Rule 10b5-1 and its affirmative defense for Trading Plans reflects an 
attempt by the SEC to resolve its differences with the federal courts in the “use 
versus possession” debate. The rule was designed to give the SEC what it wanted 
(an awareness test that would ease the burden of enforcement), while appeasing the 
courts’ demand for scienter (with the affirmative defense). In addition, Trading 
Plans would offer insiders more flexibility and certainty in legitimate trading. Since 
its adoption, however, the rule has had unintended and unwanted consequences. A 
number of reforms have been suggested by scholars and marketed participants, but 
each of these reforms would likely upset this delicate compromise. This may explain 
the SEC’s demonstrated hesitancy to embrace significant reform of Rule 10b5-1 to 
date. Nevertheless, the media attention and consequent public pressure for Trading 
Plan reform has virtually assured that some rule changes are on the horizon. As one 
fund manager put it, “[I] would be shocked if the SEC” does not act.252 The takeaway 
is that if there is to be enduring reform to the current Trading Plan regime, it cannot 
be achieved by merely tweaking or supplementing the current language of Rule 
10b5-1. An entirely new regime must be put in place. 
 
                                                 
250 See Melbinger, supra note 132. 
251 Ed Welsch, Trading Plans Offer a Good Clue to Sell, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2008, 
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120770890145300645, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z3BL-QLXM (considering “any plan of less than 12 months in length an 
aggressive use” of Rule 10b5-1(c)). 
252 Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 6. 
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VI.  FROM CRISIS TO RATIONAL REFORM 
 
One’s choice of solutions to the Trading Plan problem will depend on where 
one locates the crisis. Is the principal concern that Trading Plans have exposed a gap 
in enforcement coverage resulting in some insiders being permitted to profit by 
trading on their company’s material nonpublic information? Or is the controversy 
over Trading Plans symptomatic of a broader and deeper concern: that the current 
enforcement coverage is unprincipled, undefined, and therefore irrational and 
inefficient. Though the media and SEC focus has been on the ability of insiders to 
exploit Trading Plans to beat the market, no one has stopped to ask why—at least in 
the context of Trading Plan transactions authorized by the insider’s firm—this is a 
problem. It is only a problem if such trading is harmful or unfair. So far it has simply 
been assumed that such Plan trading is harmful and unfair. But an irony in the SEC’s 
introduction of Trading Plans has been that their efficient use by insiders and firms 
as a means of compensation has exposed a discrete sphere of insider trading that is 
economically harmless and morally unproblematic. Thus, rather than serve to 
increase the enforcement power of the SEC, the introduction of Trading Plans may 
have cleared the path to rational reform in insider trading law through liberalization 
and decriminalization. Such a proposed reform is motivated and outlined in what 
follows. 
As noted above, Section 10(b) insider trading liability typically falls under one 
of two theories: the classical theory and the misappropriation theory. This Author 
has argued elsewhere253 that, at least for purposes of moral and economic evaluation, 
it makes sense to refine the distinction still further by dividing the classical theory 
into two more categories based on whether the insider has undertaken some express 
or tacit commitment not to trade on her company’s material nonpublic information: 
 
Issuer-Proscribed Insider Trading: Insider trades on material nonpublic 
information where the insider has promised—or otherwise undertaken 
pursuant to company policy [express or implied]—not to trade on such 
information.254 
 
Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading: Insider trades on material nonpublic 
information [with the firm’s approval] . . . (It is presumed that the issuer’s 
policy allowing insider trading is disclosed to the investing public.)255 
 
Assuming an imaginary legal regime that does not already prohibit insider 
trading,256 this Author has argued a rigorous moral and economic analysis reflects 
that, while both trading under the misappropriation theory and issuer-proscribed 
                                                 
253 See Anderson, supra note 25, at 18. 
254 Id. at 27 (referring to it as “promissory insider trading”). 
255 Id. at 28 (referring to it as “nonpromissory insider trading”). 
256 This is done to insure the morality of insider trading can be tested independent of 
any social expectations arising solely from the fact that certain conduct is illegal. Id. at 27. 
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insider trading are immoral and economically inefficient, issuer-licensed insider 
trading is morally permissible and harmless from the standpoint of economic 
efficiency.257 If this conclusion is correct, then not only is liability for issuer-licensed 
insider trading unnecessary, it is unfair and unjust. Nevertheless, there remains the 
difficulty of tailoring an enforcement regime that can efficiently distinguish between 
these permissible and impermissible forms of insider trading. A modified form of 
the 10b5-1 Trading Plan might serve this purpose. 
Recall that firms typically anticipate and negotiate the ability of employees to 
use Trading Plans to profit from the use of material nonpublic information. As noted 
in Part V.A.1, firms relying on market-beating Plan trading as part of their 
compensation packages typically disclose the establishment of Trading Plans in their 
regulatory filings.258 Such permission and disclosure begins to resemble the use of 
Trading Plans as a limited form of issuer-licensed insider trading. This Article 
argues, such use of Trading Plans should not be regarded as a source of concern, but 
rather openly embraced and expanded by the law. The liberalizing move of openly 
permitting issuer-licensed insider trading as regulated through a modified Trading 
Plan model would result in a more rational, efficient, and just insider trading 
enforcement regime. The proposed reform is outlined first, and then it is defended. 
 
A.  Proposed Regime Change 
 
The reform proposed here would modify Trading Plans (henceforth “Modified 
Trading Plans” or “Modified Plans”) to permit insiders complete freedom to actively 
trade (or abstain from trading) based on their firm’s material nonpublic information, 
so long as (1) the insider’s Modified Plan is approved by the firm and (2) the 
authorizing firm has disclosed to the investing public that it allows its insiders to 
trade based on the firm’s material nonpublic information through Modified Plans. 
By requiring the firm to authorize each Modified Plan, the new rule would 
ensure only issuer-licensed insider trading would be granted safe harbor. Issuer-
proscribed and misappropriation trading would remain subject to Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 liability. Authorization of these Modified Plans could be handled directly 
by the firm’s general counsel or through its compliance department. Most firms 
already have some form of procedure in place for authorizing Trading Plans under 
the current regime, and this new rule would not require any significant change in 
their practices. 
Firms allowing insiders to trade pursuant to Modified Trading Plans under the 
liberal regime proposed here must disclose this practice. But the firm’s Modified 
                                                 
257 Anderson, supra note 25, at 27–54; see also, John P. Anderson, What’s the Harm in 
Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2015) (arguing 
that issuer-licensed insider trading is morally permissible, and, inter alia, criticizing 
Professor William Wang’s use of the “Law of Conservation of Securities” to support his 
claim that such trading results in wrongful harm). Arguments for the moral permissibility of 
issuer-licensed insider trading are also summarized below. See discussion infra Parts VI.B., 
VI.C.  
258 See Henderson et al., supra note 236, at 20. 
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Trading Plan disclosure requirement will end there. Firms will neither be required 
to disclose ex ante the contents of its insiders Modified Plans, nor when they are 
established, altered, or terminated. Nevertheless, this minimal disclosure 
requirement will be sufficient to place the investing public on notice that the firm 
allows its employees to trade based on the firm’s material nonpublic information.259 
It will, therefore, allow investors to make an informed decision about whether to 
trade in the firm’s shares.260 At the same time, this minimal disclosure requirement 
will avoid the problems of front-running and of potentially misleading the public 
that would likely arise if more detailed disclosure were required.261 
Though firms should not be required to disclose individual Modified Trading 
Plans or their contents ex ante, insofar as the ability to use these Modified Plans will 
be bargained for by firms as part of their compensation for employees, firms should 
disclose this compensation ex post. Firms should therefore disclose their insiders’ 
Modified Trading Plan profits in some summary form.262 
Finally, the Adler use test (supplemented by the strong presumption of use 
where there is knowing possession of material nonpublic information263) should 
replace the current Rule 10b5-1 awareness test in determining insider trading 
liability for all trades that occur outside Modified Trading Plans. This will have the 
effect of making Modified Trading Plans a nonexclusive safe harbor from Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 insider trading liability. As explained above, despite the SEC’s 
stated aspiration of improving “clarity and certainty” in insider trading law with the 
introduction of its awareness standard,264 it has added to the confusion. At least in 
the context of insider trading, the SEC simply invented the term “awareness.” This 
has left many confused as to whether “awareness” differs from “knowing 
possession,” and if so, how.265 Moreover, the “awareness” test must be applied in 
                                                 
259 See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1515–20 (1999) (arguing that disclosure of general intent to allow 
trading on the firm’s material nonpublic is sufficient to avoid deception). 
260 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 25, at 36–40; Prakash, supra note 259, at 1515–20. 
261 See supra Part V.A.1. 
262 Professor Henderson makes a similar suggestion. Henderson, supra note 125, at 
550–51. 
263 Of course some courts may be unwilling to recognize such a presumption in the 
criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(suggesting such a burden shift against the defendant in the criminal prosecution would suffer 
constitutional infirmities). However, as Professor Donald C. Langevoort points out, some of 
the practical burden of proof under the use test (even absent an Adler-style presumption) “is 
ameliorated by the fact that” subjective intent for insider trading “can be proven 
circumstantially,” allowing fact-finders to “draw inferences about causation from the 
surrounding facts.” Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and 
the Scienter Requirement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 52, 54 (Stephen 
M. Bainbridge ed., 2013). 
264 August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,727. 
265 See id. at 51,727 n.105 (noting some commenters on the proposed rule “stated that 
‘aware’ was an unclear term that may be interpreted to mean something less than ‘knowing 
possession’”); see also Swanson, supra note 47, at 206 (“Although it is not certain that Rule 
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tandem with the Rule 10b5-1 affirmative defenses, which are designed to prevent 
any “overbroad” applications.266 But, as noted above, SEC interpretations of the 
“good-faith” restriction on the availability of the affirmative defenses under the Rule 
leave insiders guessing as to whether their compliance with the letter of the law will 
not still leave them exposed to civil and criminal liability. Where the “awareness” 
test leaves room for civil or criminal liability without scienter, the requirement of 
deliberate use would protect insiders from being found criminally liable for morally 
innocent conduct. Thus, adopting the Adler use test appears to be the best way to 
bring coherence to the existing enforcement regime by respecting the Section 10(b) 
requirement of scienter without undermining enforcement. 
Having laid out the basic outline for the proposed reform, the next sections 
evaluate the comparative advantages of the proposed reform. 
 
B.  No Economic Harm and Clear Economic Benefits 
 
The scholarly debate concerning the overall economic impact of insider trading 
on individual traders and the market is vigorous and ongoing.267 The point that needs 
to be emphasized here, however, is that the best arguments for economic harms and 
inefficiencies resulting from insider trading would not apply to the issuer-licensed 
insider trading permitted through the proposed Modified Trading Plans. Instead, 
there would be a number of obvious economic advantages that could be gained by 
legalizing issuer-licensed insider trading through Modified Trading Plans. 
The impact of insider trading on the counterparties to insider transactions is 
disputed.268 The argument that the counterparty is harmed by insider trading 
typically turns on the seemingly straightforward claim that, if the counterparty knew 
what the insider knows, then she would not have sold at the price she did.269 The 
counterparty, therefore, loses the difference between the transaction price and the 
price the stock would trade at with the release of the insider’s material nonpublic 
information. But, as many commentators have recognized (most notably Professor 
Henry Manne), the relevant issue is not what the counterparty would have done if 
she had the same information as the insider, but whether the counterparty would 
have behaved any differently had the insider never traded at all.270 In short, an 
                                                 
10b5-1’s awareness standard matches the SEC’s knowing possession position, the two 
doctrines certainly could be the same.”). 
266 August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,727. 
267 See Anderson, supra note 25, at 7–17. 
268 See id. at 7. 
269 See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 (1961) (“If purchasers on 
an exchange had available material information known by a selling insider, we may assume 
that their investment judgment would be affected and their decision whether to buy might 
accordingly be modified. Consequently, any sales by the insider must await disclosure of the 
information.”). 
270 See, e.g., Manne, supra note 180, at 933–34; see also William J. Carney, Signaling 
and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863, 870 (1987); Henry G. Manne, 
Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 552 (1970).  
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insider’s trading only inflicts an economic harm on the counterparty if, but for the 
insider’s trading, the counterparty would not have traded.271 This is almost never the 
case where trades are made on the open market. Of course, sufficient insider entry 
into the market for a stock may move its price. Such price movement may, in turn, 
lead speculators (who typically trade based on price) to trade in the relevant stock.272 
But this does not result in an obvious net economic harm to those who trade in the 
stock while insiders affect its price. This is because it is likely there will be an equal 
number of short-swing investors trading on the same side as the insiders as there will 
be trading against them.273 
But even if one rejects this logic and remains convinced that someone must be 
paying for the insider’s risk-free profits—it must be the firm’s shareholders (both 
present and future)—this is not a problem for issuer-licensed insider trading. As 
noted in Part III.C, where firms expressly or tacitly approve of their insiders’ trading 
on material nonpublic information, they offset the insiders’ gains with a reduction 
in other forms of compensation. Consequently, as Professor Henderson explains, 
there is no economic harm: “Current shareholders should be happy with a deal that 
pays managers in part out of the hide of future shareholders,” and ultimately the firm 
will “internalize any costs arising from this payment scheme, since future 
shareholders should take this into account when deciding whether and at what price 
to buy shares.”274 Moreover, since most shareholders are diversified, those “who 
have to pay less for executive talent in one firm have to pay more in another firm, 
simply by virtue of when they enter the shareholder pool.”275 Thus, “[o]n average, 
shareholders should be indifferent.”276 
Another economic harm commonly attributed to insider trading is that it forces 
market makers to increase the spread between their bid and ask prices to protect 
against adverse selection by insider trading.277 This increase in the bid-ask spread 
can inflict an economic harm on firms by raising their cost of capital. But where 
such insider trading is issuer-licensed, the firms willingly internalize this cost, again, 
presumably because this cost is outweighed by corresponding benefits to the firm.278 
It is important to emphasize, however, that the result is not economically harmless 
when firm members engage in issuer-proscribed insider trading (i.e., in breach of an 
express or implied commitment to the firm not to trade). This is because firms may 
not recover the costs of issuer-proscribed insider trading through reduced direct 
compensation. Consequently, such trading may hurt both current and future 
shareholders of the firm. 
  
                                                 
271 See, e.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 93 (1966). 
272 Cf. id. at 94–96 (describing speculators). 
273 See Anderson, supra note 25, at 12. 
274 Henderson, supra note 125, at 507–08. 
275 Id. at 543–44. 
276 Id. 
277 See, e.g., Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical 
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 105 (2004). 
278 See Anderson, supra note 25, at 30–31; Henderson, supra note 125, at 544. 
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Insider trading incentivizes entrepreneurialism by allowing insiders to profit 
from the good news they generate for the firm, which is often regarded as a virtue.279 
But the countervailing concern is that the ability to trade on material nonpublic 
information can just as easily create perverse incentives for firm employees to create 
bad news.280 Insider traders profit from volatility of any kind—good or bad. But 
there are a number of considerations that would weaken any incentive for insiders 
to try to create bad news. For example, such conduct would likely affect their 
compensation and put their jobs in jeopardy.281 But, in any event, under the reform 
proposed here, only trading pursuant to a Modified Trading Plan that is preapproved 
by the firm would be permitted. All other forms of insider trading currently 
proscribed by law would remain illegal. Consequently, firms would be free to reject 
any proposed short selling by employees. Indeed the firm will be free to tailor its 
employee insider trading practices however it chooses. They would be free to reject 
any trading suspected as harmful to the firm. For example, a firm that otherwise 
allows Modified Trading Plan transactions could impose a blackout during a 
takeover negotiation. 
One of the more significant costs to firms from insider trading is that of 
compliance and litigation. But it should be easy to see how permitting issuer-
licensed trading through Modified Trading Plans should significantly reduce such 
costs. It was noted above that 10b5-1 Trading Plans have already significantly 
reduced compliance costs by offering firms an express rule-based procedure 
(however flawed) for allowing insiders to trade while minimizing risk of liability. In 
addition, the availability of the affirmative defense for Trading Plans helps firms 
discourage civil and criminal insider-trading-related actions against the firm and its 
insiders. Liberalizing the rule and expanding the safe harbor for insiders to trade 
would only amplify these advantages to firms. 
 
C.  Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading Is Morally Permissible 
 
But economic considerations aside, one might still object that all insider trading 
based on material nonpublic information should continue to be proscribed because 
it is inherently dishonest, deceptive, and unfair. While there is truth to this claim 
when directed to issuer-proscribed insider trading and trading under the 
misappropriation theory,282 there is no moral basis for proscribing the issuer-licensed 
insider trading that would be permitted under this proposal. Both issuer-proscribed 
insider trading and trading under the misappropriation theory involve dishonesty and 
deception, the former by breaching a commitment to the firm283 and the latter by 
                                                 
279 See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Entrepreneurship, Compensation, and the Corporation, 
14 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 3, 14 (2011). 
280 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of 
Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982); Morris Mendelson, Book Review, The 
Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470, 489–90 (1969). 
281 See Anderson, supra note 25, at 13–14; see also MANNE, supra note 271, at 150. 
282 See Anderson, supra note 25, at 36. 
283 See id. at 18–19. 
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breaching a commitment to the source of the information.284 Aside from whatever 
inherent wrong there may be in breaking promises generally, the issue-proscribed 
trader and the misappropriator impose an identifiable harm on the firm and the 
source respectively by undermining the value of the commitment that was sought.285 
In addition, one could argue the issuer-proscribed insider trader enjoys an unfair 
advantage over other market participants. This is because the other market 
participants reasonably operate under the presumption that no insider trading based 
on material nonpublic information occurs by insiders of firms that do not permit 
such trading. Market participants may price and trade in that company’s shares with 
this presumption in mind. When the issuer-proscribed insider trades on material 
nonpublic information, she takes unfair advantage of market expectations built 
around this understanding.286 
But notice, the issuer-licensed insider who trades pursuant to the Modified 
Trading Plans proposed here is neither dishonest nor unfair. There is no dishonesty 
or deception vis-à-vis the firm because the insider has candidly negotiated her ability 
to trade on material nonpublic information as part of her compensation, and the firm 
must approve each Modified Plan trade before it is made.287 And there is no 
deception or unfairness vis-à-vis other market participants because the Modified 
Trading Plan disclosure requirement gives the market notice that insiders may trade 
based on the firm’s material nonpublic information.288 Market participants may, 
therefore, demand a correspondingly lower price for the stock or refuse to trade in 
the firm’s shares altogether—the choice is theirs.289 By respecting other market 
participants with this disclosure, the issuer-licensed insider trader who trades 
pursuant to a Modified Plan does not take advantage. In the words of philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, market participants are thereby respected as “ends in themselves” 
and not as mere means to the trader’s ends.290 
 
D.  The Proposed Reform Is Consistent with Existing Statutory Authority 
 
The SEC’s rulemaking authority can effect entirely the reforms proposed here 
because they are consistent with statutory authority and current Supreme Court 
precedent.291 Recall that Section 10(b) insider trading liability must capture some 
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fraudulent deception on the part of the trader.292 Under the misappropriation theory 
as articulated in O’Hagan, the fraud is on the source of the information.293 Under the 
classical theory as articulated in Chiarella, the fraud is on the shareholder (or future 
shareholder).294 In the case of misappropriation, the deception lies in the failure to 
disclose the intention to trade to the source of the information. The deception being 
that, without such disclosure, the information is obtained under false pretenses.295 In 
the case of the classical insider, the deception also lies in the failure to disclose, but 
it is typically thought the required disclosure pertains to the underlying information, 
not the intent to trade. There is, however, no obvious reason for this asymmetry, 
particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s claim in O’Hagan that the two theories 
are intended to complement one another in capturing the entire universe of the same 
deceptive conduct (the one when it is perpetrated by insiders and the other when it 
is perpetrated by outsiders).296 If the misappropriation model is followed, disclosure 
to the investing public that a firm will allow its insiders to trade based on material 
nonpublic information through Modified Trading Plans when it is in the interest of 
the firm should be adequate to put current and future shareholders on notice and 
allow the firm to avoid Section 10(b) deception under O’Hagan. Market participants 
can then choose to buy, hold, or sell shares in the firm informed by this information. 
And, no doubt, the firm’s decision whether to continue to offer compensation 
through Modified Trading Plans will in turn be informed by the marketplace’s 
reaction to its policy.297 
The claim that firms’ advance disclosure of intent to allow insiders to trade on 
their material nonpublic information should be sufficient disclosure to avoid Section 
10(b) deception is not so outrageous as to have never been advanced before. For 
example, Professor Henderson argues there is “arguably no deception [under 
O’Hagan] in a case in which the firm discloses that insiders are likely to be trading 
based on informational advantages.”298 Henderson adds the disclose or abstain 
requirement may be satisfied by the “generic disclosure about insider propensity to 
trade on inside information,” which is likely to “achieve the same kind of price 
adjustment and cost internalization” as full disclosure of the actual facts “on 
average.”299 
Moreover, the sufficiency of notice of intent to trade on material nonpublic 
information is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Chiarella that Section 
10(b) does not ensure parity of information; it only protects against information 
advantages acquired by deception.300 Accordingly, allowing insiders to trade based 
on material nonpublic information according to Modified Trading Plans, as 
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proposed here, would simply add one more category of such trading to those already 
permitted, such as those who trade based on information acquired by accident or 
eavesdropping,301 those who trade where the tipper does not benefit,302 those who 
trade where intent to trade is announced to the source under the misappropriation 
theory,303 and those who engage in insider abstinence (as discussed in detail above). 
Finally, some have argued the real rationale behind the prohibition of insider 
trading is less about fraud than it is about property rights to information304 or simply 
wrongful conduct.305 If this is true, the nonexclusive safe harbor for insider trading 
pursuant to Modified Trading Plans proposed here would be perfectly consistent. 
After all, such trading would not be permitted unless first approved by the 
proprietors of the information (the firm) and such issuer-licensed trading would not 
be wrongful. 
 
E.  Existing Enforcement Regime Sufficient to Address Timing of Disclosure 
 
The reform proposed here does nothing to specifically address the issue of 
timing disclosures around Plan trades.306 The availability of firm-sanctioned 
Modified Trading Plans would, however, significantly reduce incentives for insiders 
to time disclosures (or to accelerate or delay the making of news) to advantage 
trades. After all, Modified Trading Plans could be established at any time to take 
advantage of news in its natural course. And, in any event, as indicated above, the 
existing regime seems adequate to address any harm to the firm or investors from 
improper timing of disclosures. For example, the existing regime already has the 
ability to find liability for false disclosures, or disclosures that were improperly 
omitted from required filings.307 This leaves only harmless acceleration or delay of 
disclosure that is otherwise permitted by disclosure rules. The apparent lack of harm 
and extreme difficulty of proof relating to such tinkering with the timing of 
disclosure or news to benefit Plan trades (along with the reduced incentive for such 
timing decisions under a Modified Trading Plan regime) suggest that direct 
regulation would do more harm than good by placing otherwise innocent timing 
decisions under regulatory scrutiny. 
In sum, consider some obvious advantages of adopting the reforms outlined 
above over preserving the existing regime. The proposed reforms offer a coherent 
approach to insider trading enforcement—whether it is justified in terms of fraud, 
                                                 
301 See, e.g., SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
302 See, e.g., SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2004). 
303 See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
304 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 598–605 
(2002); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 266–70 (1991). 
305 See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary 
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1377 (2009). 
306 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
307 For example, there are antifraud provisions in the Securities Act, at 15 U.S.C. § 77q 
(2013), and the Exchange Act, at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2013). 
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wrongful conduct, or property rights. Permissible and impermissible insider trading 
can now be more clearly delineated. The conduct that is proscribed can actually be 
enforced with justifiable vigor because it only captures conduct that is in fact 
deceitful, unfair, and harmful. By contrast, in addition to allowing for the 
prosecution of insider trading absent a showing of scienter, the existing regime 
punishes issuer-licensed insider trading (which is not deceitful, unfair, or harmful) 
with massive fines and stiff prison sentences. Litigation costs to firms defending 
against insider trading claims will be reduced under the proposed reform. Arguably 
no statutory revisions would be necessary for its implementation; the change could 
be effected entirely through rulemaking. It is true the SEC would have to eat some 
humble pie in admitting, as it turns out, not all insider trading based on material 
nonpublic information is wrong and harmful (something they have been unwilling 
to admit so far), but the benefit of a more rational and just enforcement regime 
should be worth it. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The SEC is poised to take action in the face of compelling evidence that 
corporate insiders are availing themselves of rule-sanctioned Trading Plans to beat 
the market. Since the market advantage insiders have enjoyed from Plan trading can 
be traced to loopholes in the current regulatory scheme, increased enforcement of 
the existing rules cannot solve the problem. But simply tweaking the existing rule 
structure to close these loopholes would not work either. This is because the SEC 
adopted the current rule as a part of a delicate compromise with the courts in the 
“use versus possession” debate over the appropriate test of scienter for insider 
trading liability. The current rule reflects the SEC’s preferred test (mere 
“awareness”), but it provides for Trading Plans as an affirmative defense in order to 
pass judicial scrutiny. Any attempt to simply close the loopholes in Trading Plans 
while maintaining the awareness test would upset this delicate compromise. Thus, 
only a comprehensive change to the current insider trading enforcement regime can 
address the issue. The SEC should confront this crisis by adopting much-needed 
reform. 
The reform proposed here begins with the recognition that Plan trading is 
generally done with the firm’s awareness and consent. Such trading is, therefore, a 
form of issuer-licensed insider trading. Since there are strong arguments that there 
is no moral wrong or economic harm done by issuer-licensed insider trading, the 
regulatory regime should openly embrace it as a permissible form of compensation 
through firm-sanctioned Modified Trading Plans, so long as there is adequate 
disclosure. Though such liberalization would represent a radical departure from the 
current enforcement regime, it would be within the SEC’s rulemaking authority and 
would be consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Most importantly, it would 
dramatically improve the current enforcement regime in terms of justice, clarity, 
efficiency, and coherence. 
The proposed liberalization of insider trading law would be limited strictly to 
issuer-licensed insider trading through Modified Trading Plans; it would not protect 
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insiders who trade by deception. Moreover, insider profits from Modified Trading 
Plan transactions should be disclosed to the investing public. 
It is sometimes said there is nothing like a good crisis for effecting much needed 
change. The current media attention and public scrutiny over corporate insiders’ 
exploitation of rule-sanction Trading Plans may be just the crisis to spur the SEC to 
adopt a more rational and just approach to insider trading enforcement. The outline 
for such reform has been proposed herein. 
